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The analysis of economic factors usually applied for examining gender inequality in the 
labour market suggests that former post communist countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe have reached similarly high standards of gender equality compared to Western 
European countries. This paper aims at comparing attitudes to women’s work between 
transition and OECD countries highlighting the explanatory power of societal norms. The 
analysis of attitudes, their determinants and their change in regions and countries is based 
on mainly two waves (1994 and 1998) of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). 
These data reveal that a strikingly higher share of people in the East than in the West 
agrees with traditional values on women’s work. The large homogeneity in patriarchal 
values of Eastern European people with differing socio-economic background explains 
these regional differences. The East-West gap in traditional value orientations is likely to 

















Many thanks are due to John Micklewright and Thomas Straubhaar for comments and 
advice. This research was supported by the University of Hamburg with a post-graduate 
grant and the DAAD.   - 2 - 
 
1  Introduction 
The transition process from centrally planned to market economies in Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) confronted the population of post-communist countries with a change of 
labour market structures. Women’s chances to integrate successfully in new work 
relations are very much dependent on the prevalence of gender equality in CEE labour 
markets.  
Gender equality in the labour market is often measured by comparing women’s 
and men’s economic characteristics, like gender-specific human capital, labour force 
participation rates and the gender pay gap. If these economic measures are applied in 
order to compare gender equality in the labour market between CEE and Western 
European countries we find generally that CEE countries keep up perfectly well with 
their Western neighbours.  
However, pure economic factors might not catch the ‘whole truth’ of gender 
equality. Even though women’s labour force participation rates were much higher in CEE 
than in the industrialised West during communism there is great scepticism that this 
implied higher gender equality in CEE than in pre-1990 OECD countries. During 
communism, women’s full-time labour force participation was constrained in order to 
maximise the use of all available productive resources to sustain economic growth by 
‘extensive’ means. In contrast, women’s labour force participation in the West was a 
result of the impact of women’s organisations and was related to the idea of women’s 
self-realisation. Hence, economic factors compared across regions might reflect different 
regional policies regarding the genders and a ‘good’ economic outcome in terms of 
gender parity does not mean a preferable outcome regarding gender-equal opportunities 
and choices.  
Instead of using economic indicators for measuring gender equality in the labour 
market, this paper aims at analysing and comparing patriarchal attitudes to women’s work 
in and between transition and (pre-1990) OECD countries. It examines what people from 
different societies actually think about a gender equal division of work in the household 
and economic sphere. This different measure of gender disparities offers new 
perspectives for explaining gender inequality by highlighting the importance of societal 
norms and value systems in different countries and regions that cannot easily be captured - 3 - 
by pure economic factors. Women looking for work in a society characterised by a 
general belief in the traditional gender division of work are very probable to be worse off 
in terms of work opportunities and income than women living in societies where liberal 
gender attitudes are predominant. Hence, it is assumed that patriarchal attitudes shape 
women’s opportunities in the labour market and can serve as a proxy for measuring 
gender inequality in society.  
This paper is not the first to compare gender attitudes between transition countries 
and other regions. Panayotova & Brayfield (1997) examined gender-attitudes in the USA 
and Hungary using data from the 1992 round of the International Social Survey 
Programme. The same data source but round 1994 were used by Braun et al. (1999) for 
comparing gender role ideology between socialist and non-socialist countries. The World 
Value Survey was the basis of Inglehart & Norris (2003). While these studies interpret 
gender attitudes in a more general sense by using a summarised gender attitude index 
derived from responses to several questions on attitudes this paper has a more simple and 
transparent approach by focusing exclusively on the examination of attitudes on women’s 
work. The additional value added of this paper is the aim to explain regional gaps in 
attitudes by examining determinants of regional and gender differences in attitudes to 
women’s work using a regression framework. Consequently, it will be also examined 
whether it is regional differences of population characteristics or of the impact of 
determinants that drive the regional gap in patriarchal attitudes. Furthermore, this paper 
sheds light on future patterns of social change of gender-role attitudes in transition and 
OECD countries based on age group and cross-sectional data analyses. 
Micro-data derive from mainly two rounds
1 of the International Social Survey 
Program (ISSP). The 1994 round (also used by Braun et al., 1999) includes seven CEE 
and 14 Western industrialised countries and the 1998 round (not used before by other 
authors for the examination of gender attitudes) provides data on nine CEE and 18 OECD 
countries.  
The paper will be structured as follows. Section 2 compares gender equality 
between East and West by investigating regional differences using some economic 
                                                 
1 The coverage of transition countries is very small for the 1988 and 1991 rounds, so that only some descriptive results 
will be discussed for these years. - 4 - 
indicators. In addition, it portrays different political and societal trajectories related to 
women’s role in the labour market. Section 3 describes the ISSP micro data that is used 
for the examination of attitudes to women’s work. With the tools of descriptive and 
logistic regression analysis, Section 4 examines differences in gender norms between 
East and West and compares women’s with men’s attitudes. Where do regional and 
gender differences in attitudes to women’s work derive from? Section 5 compares the 
impact of individual background characteristics between regions and gender. In addition, 
the extent to which the regional gap in patriarchal attitudes is a consequence of regional 
differences in population characteristics or of differences in the impact of those 
characteristics will be estimated using an Oaxaca decomposition. Section 6 aims at 
forecasting changes of gender attitudes over time for regions and countries. Section 7 
concludes. 
 
2  Economic indictors on gender equality and different trajectories in 
the increase of women’s participation in the labour market in East 
and West 
Are women at a greater disadvantage than men in the labour market in CEE countries 
today? This Section examines first some economic indictors for comparing gender 
equality in the labour market between East and West (Section 2.1). Even though these 
indicators show relative similar patterns between both regions, reasons for disparities in 
gender equality between East and West are discussed in a second step by describing 
different trajectories in the development of women’s participation in the labour market 
for both regions (Section 2.2).  
 
2.1  Similarities between East and West regarding economic indicators on gender 
equality in the labour market 
Table 1 presents three economic indicators used to interpret gender equality in the labour 
market: gender equality in human capital measured by female and male gross enrolment 
ratios in tertiary education, gender employment/population ratio and the gender pay ratio. 
The selection of transition countries is driven by data availability. These countries are 
compared with five OECD countries: Sweden due to its high regulation on gender 
equality, the Mediterranean country Italy characterised by a traditionally less emphasis on 
gender equality and three other countries with some regulation (Germany, the USA and - 5 - 
the UK). In addition, Table 1 gives also the averages of the economic indicators for a 
group of CEE and OECD countries.  
Column 1 of Table 1 shows the female/male gross enrolment ratio (GER) in 
tertiary education. The GER is the number of students enrolled in tertiary education, 
regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population in the theoretical age group 
for the same level of education. In all countries women are in an advantageous position. 
In Albania and Latvia 60 percent more women than men are enrolled in tertiary 
education; women’s advantage is lowest in the Czech Republic and Slovenia with an 
about 10 percent higher share in tertiary education. However, a similar trend of the 
‘feminisation of tertiary education’ can be observed for OECD countries. 
Within OECD countries Sweden shows the highest advantage for women in 
access to tertiary education (about 50 percent more women than men). Italy, the UK and 
the US reflect the OECD average: in Western industrialised countries about 24 percent 
more women than men are enrolled in tertiary education. The average gender enrolment 
ratio for transition countries is 1.37 showing a substantially higher educational advantage 
of women over men in post-communist compared to OECD countries. 
Column 2 displays a measure of women’s economic independence by presenting 
the employment/population ratio of people in the working age (15 to 64 year-olds) by 
gender and again the female to male ratio. We find now a reverse picture to education, 
showing that women’s higher human capital is not efficiently used in the labour market 
since women make up a smaller share of the employed than men. In transition countries 
female employment is relatively high compared to men’s. There is practically no 
difference between the share of women and men in the labour market in Lithuania. Only 
in the Czech Republic and Hungary a considerably higher share of women (about 20 
percent) than men is not employed.  
On average, in transition countries about 14 percent less females than males are 
employed (ratio 0.86). This compares to 21 percent lower employment of women 
compared to men in OECD countries. Hence, the gender gap regarding employment is 
considerably lower in former post-communist countries than in Western industrialised 
countries. Nevertheless, a higher share of women is employed in OECD countries (60 
percent) than in transition countries (54 percent).  - 6 - 
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1998  1998 
Albania  11  19  1.73             
Bulgaria  35  47  1.34  54  48  0.89  69     
Czech  29  31  1.07  73  57  0.78  81     
Estonia  45  70  1.56  66  57  0.87  73     
Hungary  35  45  1.29  63  50  0.78  78     
Latvia  48  79  1.65  62  56  0.91  80     
Lithuania  42  63  1.50  60  57  0.96  71     
Macedonia  21  28  1.33               
Moldova  24  31  1.29               
Poland  46  66  1.43  59  48  0.82  79     
Romania  25  30  1.20  69  58  0.85  76     
Russia  56  72  1.29          70     
Slovakia  29  32  1.10  62  52  0.84  78     
Slovenia  52  70  1.35  69  59  0.86  85     
Italy  43  57  1.33  69  41  0.60    91  93 
Germany        73  59  0.80    81  83 
Sweden  56  85  1.52  77  73  0.95    82  88 
UK  53  67  1.26  78  65  0.83    76  79 
USA  63  83  1.32  79  67  0.85      76 
Mean CEE 














(5.1)     
Mean OECD 
















Source: UNESCO (2003) for gross enrolment ratio, OECD (2002) and EUROSTAT (2003) for data on employment 
rates. Gender pay gap data are not directly comparable. The sources and measures are as follows: A) UNICEF (1999): 
monthly gender pay ratios (not adjusted for hours worked). In general data refer to the year 1996, but for Hungary, 
Bulgaria, Romania, and Lithuania to 1997 and for Latvia to 1998. B) Eurostat, ECHP, wave 5 (2003): Ratio of 
women’s average gross hourly earnings with respect to men’s average gross hourly earnings based on earning data for 
all individuals employed 15 hours or more at the time of the survey in 1998 (adjusted for hours worked). C) OECD 
(2002): gender pay gap by median of wage structure, hourly earnings 1998 (adjusted for hours worked). OECD country 
average refers to the following countries for employment ratio and gender pay ratio, source C: Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA. The OECD country group covers the same countries for source B of the 
gender pay ratio with the exception of Australia, Austria, Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland and the USA. For 
                                                 
2 The gross enrolment ratio is the number of pupils enrolled in a given level of education, regardless of age, expressed 
as a percentage of the population in the theoretical age group for the same level of education. This contrasts to the net 
enrolment ratio, that is the number of pupils in the theoretical age group for a given grade/level of education enrolled in 
that level expressed as percentage of the total population in that age group. 
3 The employment ratio expresses the number of employed people between 15 and 64 years old as a share of the 
working-age population in the same age group here for women and men separately. Data refer to 2001 for all countries. 
Even though sources for OECD and the transition countries are different, sources are comparable: for the four countries 
given in both sources the Slovak and Czech Republic show exactly the same female employment ratio, and for both 
sources Hungary and Poland respectively have very similar values with a smaller ratio of 0.02 for the first and a higher 
ratio of 0.06 for the second in the given EUROSTAT source.  
4 The gender pay ratio gives the average earning for women devided by the average earning for men. - 7 - 
enrolment ratio the countries not covered compared to the OECD group used for the employment ratio are Finland and 
Germany. Standard deviation is given in parenthesis for the CEE and OECD unweighted country mean. 
 
Variation in women’s employment is much greater in OECD countries (the 
standard deviation of women’s employment/population ratio is 9.8 in OECD compared to 
4.3 in transition countries). In Italy, the Mediterranean country with lowest female labour 
force participation, 40 percent more working age men than women are employed.
5 On the 
other end, Scandinavian countries like Sweden are characterised by only marginal 
differences in men’s and women’s working age employment status. Gender equality here 
is similar to that in Lithuania and higher than in many other transition countries.  
The gender pay ratio, the fraction of the average male pay earned by women, is 
given in column 3. Differences in pay between women and men is of great importance as 
it has a direct effect on living standards, the level of pensions, unemployment benefits 
and other benefits paid to employees. Unfortunately, there is no one satisfactory source 
for measuring the gender pay ratio in a harmonised way across Europe so that figures are 
not directly comparable between regions. Source A (UNICEF, 1999) refers to monthly 
gender pay ratios in terms of average total monthly earnings and is available only for 
transition countries covering the years 1996 to 1998. Sources B (Eurostat, 2003) and C 
(OECD, 2002) refer to gender wage ratios calculated on the basis of hourly earnings and 
refer to the year 1998. The monthly ratios (source A) given for transition countries tend 
to show higher gender inequality than ratios based on an hourly measure (B and C) as 
men, on average, work longer hours than women. However, it is important to note, that 
female part-time employment in transition countries is still rare so that the gender pay 
gap calculation based on monthly earnings (source A) is probably relatively similar to 
gender pay gap calculations based on hourly earnings for post-communist countries.
6  
Based on the monthly ratio women in transition countries earn about 20 to 30 
percent less than their male counterparts with the exception of Slovenia, where the gender 
ratio is about 85 percent high. Surprisingly, gender pay ratios seem to reveal a quite low 
gender inequality for OECD countries with the exception of the UK and the US. This 
                                                 
5 Only the OECD countries Turkey and Mexico show considerable lower female participation rates with 63 percent 
more men employed in the first and 53 percent in the last (not shown and not included in the OECD average). 
6 This would be different for OECD countries where a great share of women work part-time which would 
effect greatly the estimation of the gender pay ratio if only total monthly earnings (and not hours worked) 
were taken into account for the calculation of the ratio. - 8 - 
stands in contrast to other data that suggest higher gender pay inequality in some Western 
industrialised countries compared to the East (Blau and Kahn, 2001). However, taking 
into account that the monthly pay calculation for transition countries  might slightly 
overestimate gender inequality, data do not show that women in transition fare 
necessarily worse than women in Germany or Sweden. Even by applying the hourly wage 
calculation, gender equality in the UK is not higher compared to that in many transition 
countries, where differences in working hours between men and women are not taken 
into account for the gender gap calculation.
7  
Taken together, women’s relative advantage compared to men in access to tertiary 
education and work seems to be slightly greater in post-communist countries while the 
gender pay ratio suggests a somewhat higher disadvantage of women in transition than in 
Western industrialised countries. Hence, given these economic indicators gender equality 
is rather similar between transitional and OECD labour markets.  
However, can economic factors indeed show the ‘whole’ picture of gender equal 
work division? Regional differences in developments of gender equality show another 
perspective of women’s integration into work. 
2.2  Dissimilarities in developments of women’s work in East and West 
In Western industrialized countries the increasing labour market participation of 
women was a gradual process stimulated by economic factors but also by societal contest. 
New opportunities for women to earn money outside the home opened during the last 
decades initially driven by an increasing service sector. The availability of part-time 
employment facilitated women’s ability to work. At the same time, the amount of time 
necessary for household activities diminished, since consumption of household 
appliances increased and the appearance of inexpensive substitutes for services 
traditionally provided by women augmented. This increased the costs of conformity to 
the traditional division of labour between male breadwinner and female homemaker in 
the West.
8  
                                                 
7 In contrast to the hypothesis of women’s higher vulnerability during the transition process, literature 
suggests, that the gender pay gap diminished in transition countries (Newell and Reilly, 2001; Brainerd, 
1997) which might be also related to an increase in return to women’s education (Munich et al., 1999).  
8 Indeed, over the last decades breadwinner-husband marriages in which the wife did not work outside 
home slid into an increasing economic disadvantage relative to other marital arrangements where both 
contribute to the family income. (Dechter and Smock, 1994) - 9 - 
Closely related to the economic stimulation of women’s work in the labour 
market was the social contest on gender norms. Starting in the 1970s, women 
participating in women’s organisations fought for women’s rights and created an agenda 
where women’s issues were discussed resulting in reinforced equal opportunities for 
women in all spheres of life in the 1980s and 1990s. The increasing female labour force 
participation was therefore paired with a discussion on gender equality regarding 
responsibilities in the household.  
Hence, both, economic factors and societal contest led to erosion in traditional 
gender roles specifying husbands as breadwinners and wives as homemakers in Western 
industrialised countries. (Blossfeld & Drobnic, 2001; Badgett et al., 2000; Frankel, 1997) 
In contrast to Western industrialised countries, communist countries used direct 
state intervention for the implementation of a socialist form of gender equality. This 
normative imposition of gender ideology impeded the development of a pluralistic and 
free debate of gender issues that shaped gender norms in the West.  
The communist ideology of gender equality did not by far reach the ambitious aim 
of equality in all spheres of life demanded by Western women’s organisations. The 
socialist term of equality for women was mainly identified with women being wage 
earners but did not question women’s primary responsibilities for childcare and 
household tasks. (Dijkstra, 1997) While in the West feminism restructured value 
orientations with e.g. one effect of a voluntarily and gradually increase of women’s entry 
into the labour force, women in the East were often constrained to work full-time due to 
two reasons. First, women’s participation in the labour market was meant to maximise the 
use of all available productive resources to sustain economic growth by ‘extensive’ 
means. Second, women had to participate in the labour market as a means of economic 
survival and not self-realisation.  
2.3  Greater adherence to traditional attitudes to women’s work in the East? 
These different trajectories in increase of women’s labour force participation in 
the West and East are likely to have impacted on people’s adherence to traditional 
attitudes to women’s work in both regions.  
Since the communist gender ideology focused only on access to paid work but not 
on the division of caring and household tasks, women’s full-time employment led to an - 10 - 
overburdening of women as workers and mothers. This so-called ‘double burden’ 
(UNICEF, 1999) might have promoted the acceptance of traditional orientations towards 
CEE women’s work and family responsibilities (Lobodzinska, 1995) in transition 
countries today. In addition, different patterns of women’s employment might matter: 
women in transition countries are generally full-time employed, while women in pre-
1990 OECD countries have a wider opportunity of part-time work. Also women’s lack of 
choice in ex-communist countries might have restrained public support for women’s 
employment. (Panayotova & Brayfield, 1997) 
Additionally, once boundaries lifted in the aftermath of communism, it makes a 
difference whether gender equality is a fundamental part of a society that developed over 
decades as it is characteristic for the West or whether gender equality was dictated from 
above as found in communist countries. Due to the imposition of gender equality in the 
work sphere people in the East experienced a discrepancy between their traditionally 
moulded expectations of women’s role as housewives and the necessity of women’s 
fulltime work in the society. The loss of a communist, societal grip caused a revitalisation 
of traditional values that were concealed during communism.  
Such a revival of traditional values was also due to the re-emergence of other 
powers within the post-communist societies like the revival of religious community life 
that was in favour of traditional beliefs on gender roles. In contrast, values in Western 
European Countries are moulded by increasing shares of populations not associated with 
any religion at all (Crouch, 1999) whereby also a relatively high share of Protestantism 
might be related to more relaxed attitudes to women’s work. 
Hence, while in the West women’s participation in the economy, women’s high 
access to tertiary education and decreasing gender gaps are argued to be most important 
for explaining the degree of liberal gender values today, it must be doubted whether this 
argument can be applied also to post-communist countries. Eastern women’s high labour 
force participation and access to tertiary education might still more reflect inheritance of 
the communist system than that it is a consequence of a profound societal agreement on 
women’s societal roles. Hence, the much longer and profounder tradition of women’s 
labour force participation in the East compared to the West might not be the reason for a 
greater acceptance of dual earner households. In contrast, the constraint of and - 11 - 
experiences with women’s full-time work might have lead to a backlash nourishing 
traditional gender values in post-communist countries today.
9 
These societal norms on gender equality in the labour force are of high 
importance. First, attitudes are likely to impact upon labour market policies and peoples 
(e.g. employers’) behaviour. Therefore, they can shape women’s equal opportunities in 
the labour market. Second, the relative high gender equality in the labour market visible 
through economic indicators today might still be inherited from the communist grip. 
Profound societal preferences for gender inequality are very likely to impact upon 
women’s role in societies and could therefore lead to increasing gender gaps in the CEE 
labour market. 
Hence, after the introduction of the ISSP data in Section 3 the following Sections 
aim at answering three main questions: 
a)  Are there differences in preferences over gender inequality between East 
and West? Section 4 compares regional and gender differences in 
attitudes. The results show a large regional discrepancy in patriarchal 
values even if population characteristics are controlled for. 
b)  Where do these regional differences derive from? Section 5 examines 
different impacts of population characteristics between genders and 
regions. I estimate the share of regional differences in agreement with the 
traditional gender stereotypes that derives from i) regionally different 
impacts of individuals’ background and ii) varying regional population 
characteristics. 
c)  Given that there is a great gap between OECD and transition countries in 
patriarchal attitudes it is interesting to know how attitudes to gender 
inequality will change over time in both regions. Section 6 examines age 
group effects and compares agreement with the gender stereotype between 
1994 and 1998. 
                                                 
9 A comparison of China and Taiwan regarding traditional values of women and men for the male-breadwinner-model 
showed similarly, that people in China think much more that women should be the homemaker even though women’s 
labour participation in China has a much more profound and longer tradition in China than in Taiwan. (Tu & Chang, 
2000) - 12 - 
3  Data 
The data used to measure attitudes to gender inequality are taken from four waves 
of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP)
10. The 1988 and 1991 ISSP rounds 
cover only one (Hungary) and four transition countries (Hungary, Poland, Eastern 
Germany and Slovenia) respectively. The 1994 round of the ISSP includes seven 
transition (Eastern Germany, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland, Bulgaria and 
Russia) and 14 OECD countries. The 1998 data comprise additionally two further Eastern 
European countries (Latvia and Slovakia) and a total of 18 Western industrialised 
countries. Even though the sample of transition countries is quite heterogeneous, data on 
Central Asia and the Caucasus are missing. Both regions differ in cultural, economic and 
geographical terms from the countries covered by ISSP. Hence, the results cannot be 
generalised for these regions that are very likely to show a higher degree of patriarchal 
attitudes to women’s work. In general, the results below refer to most recent data of the 
ISSP 1998 round. Only in Section 6 where changes in attitudes are examined are data 
from the other ISSP rounds also analysed. 
In ISSP 1998 approximately 1000 respondents per country were asked questions 
related to preferences about gender roles. Table A 1 in the Appendix shows the sample 
size, response rate, fieldwork method and sample type for each country. In all transition 
and half of other OECD countries data were obtain by face-to-face interviews. Response 
rates are over 80 percent in Latvia and Bulgaria, slightly above 50 percent for Russia and 
Hungary and small for Slovenia (35 percent) and Czech Republic (40 percent). Results on 
the last two countries need to be interpreted with caution. Also some OECD countries 
show very low response rates, especially France with only 10 and Canada with 30 percent 
of response. I exclude both countries from the analysis since results are very likely to be 
biased. In general, the weighted results of respondents’ characteristics in ISSP 1998 
approximate
11 population characteristics of the country derived from countries’ census 
data.  
                                                 
10 Further information on ISSP data beyond that given here can be found under http://www.issp.org/. 
11 I compared countries’ census data with the weighted results on population characteristics for the ISSP 1998 round. 
For some countries there is a slight bias in response. Women, people not in the labour force, youngest and oldest age 
cohorts and better educated people seem to be more likely to respond in general. However, differences in the coverage 
of population groups between country’s census and ISSP data remain generally below 5 percent of the respective group 
(see data documentation of ISSP 1998 on http://www.gesis.org/en/data_service/issp/data/1998_Religion_II.htm). - 13 - 
The focus of this analysis is on one ISSP question that is given in the form of a 
statement to which respondents are asked to register their attitude on a scale of 1 to 5.  
Table 2: Question on attitudes to women’s work 
Statement asked of respondents  Response categories 
Do you agree or disagree… 
‘A husband’s job is to earn money; a wife’s job is to look 
after the home and family’? 
 
1.  Strongly agree 
2.  Agree 
3.  Neither agree nor 
disagree 
4.  Disagree 
5.  Strongly disagree 
 
This measure for attitudes to gender inequality limits the focus to gender 
stereotypes concerning labour division within the family and leaves open gender-specific 
attitudes regarding politics, the workforce and education.  
The question used for this analysis is formulated quite neutrally in contrast to for 
example a question like: ‘Women and men should share housekeeping equally’. This 
statement would very much picture men’s and women’s distributional interests instead of 
general attitudes to women’s roles in the household. In contrast, the question in Table 2 is 
not directly related to distributional conflicts between women and men. Men gain from 
women’s work due to an increased pooled household income. Also women can improve 
their status by becoming breadwinners given the problem of the distribution of homework 
is solved. Hence, I assume that there is a relative low interference of respondents’ very 
own distributional interests impacting upon results.  
It is important to note that respondents being asked about their ideas of women’s 
work are likely to associate predominantly female full-time occupation in the East where 
part-time work is still very rare. In contrast, respondents in pre-1990 OECD countries 
might think of ‘some form of’ female occupation given the high variability of part-time 
work in the West. 
A general problem of comparing country results regards respondents’ exact 
interpretation of the question that might be determined by differences between languages 
and translations. The effect of translation differences remains a black box, e.g. we do not 
know how far different response categories mean exactly the same in each country. The 
word ‘strongly’ of the answer categories ‘strongly agree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ seems - 14 - 
open to variations in interpretation from country to country while the ‘agree’ and 
‘disagree’ difference is likely to be the same in every country. Hence, for reducing 
response differences due to these translation problems I generally analyse agreement with 
the patriarchal gender attitude and collapse therefore the answer categories ‘strongly 
agree’ and ‘agree’ into one category ‘agreement’.  
 
4  Are there differences in preferences to gender inequality between 
East and West? 
This Section provides a first glance at cross-country differences in preferences to 
gender inequality by examining the distribution of answers to the question listed in Table 
2 and by discussing gender differences in attitudes (Section 4.1). In a second step the 
‘pure’ regional and country differences in gender attitudes is measured by controlling for 
individuals’ characteristics (Section 4.2). 
 
4.1  General preferences for gender inequality 
Figure 1 displays the share of respondents for each answer category of the 
question on attitudes to women’s work by region. In OECD countries about every tenth 
respondent strongly agrees with the patriarchal gender attitude but almost every third 
respondent strongly disagrees. About 26 percent of respondents generally agree (strongly 
agree and agree) but opposition is much greater with a share of 56 percent who disagree 
with the gender attitude (strongly disagree and disagree). For transition countries the 
picture is reverse. As many as 27 percent of respondents strongly agree that a wife’s job 
is to look after home and family and only 8 percent strongly disagree. 54 percent of 
respondents with patriarchal attitudes to women’s work (strongly agree and agree) are 
opposed by only by 27 percent of respondents disagreeing in CEE countries. Only the 
share of people in the middle position (neither agree nor disagree) is similar between 
regions. Hence, descriptive regional results show a large difference between Western and 
Eastern European countries with a high preference for patriarchal gender roles in post-
communist countries. This confirms results of ISSP 1994 data (Braun et al., 1999) and 
results from the World Value Survey (Inglehart & Norris, 2003).
12  
                                                 




























How do different countries compare and what can we say about differences within 
regions? For answering this question I collapse the response categories into a dichotomy 
of respondents agreeing (strongly agree and agree) and others and compare the share of 
respondents in favour of patriarchal gender attitudes across countries in Figure 2. The 
countries are ordered first by regional groups (CEE, OECD and other countries (incl. 
developing countries)) and second by the share of agreement. 
 























Source: ISSP 1998, author’s calculations. 
Note: OECD countries are Australia, Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA and West-Germany. CEE countries are Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, East-Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Slovakia and Slovenia. Figures refer to 
the unweighted country group average. 
























































































































































































































































Figure 2: Percent of respondents agreeing with the patriarchal gender attitude by country 
Source: ISSP 1998, author’s calculations 
 
As the graph reveals there is substantial variation across the entire set of 
countries. People in the Philippines assume the top rank with almost 80 per cent agreeing 
with the patriarchal gender attitude, closely followed by 70 per cent of people in Russia. 
On the other hand, only 8 percent of respondents in Sweden think that the statement is 
right. The share of agreement in Sweden is also significantly lower (1 percent level) than 
in any other OECD and transition country as multiple comparison of agreement between 
countries reveals (Table A 2 in the Appendix). 
Within each group variation in agreement is also considerably high. The share of 
respondents in West-Germany adherent to traditional gender stereotypes is about 6 times 
higher than in Sweden.  
Regarding CEE countries, more than half of the population in Russia, Bulgaria, 
Poland, Latvia and Slovakia believe in the traditional division of work between genders. 
Traditional values in Russia are significantly more pronounced than in any other 
transition or OECD country. This is also true for Bulgaria once Russia is not taken into 
account. (see Table A 2 in the Appendix) - 17 - 




















Source: ISSP 1998, author’s calculations.  
 
One might think that the views on this issue differ greatly between men and 
women, for instance because the current construction of society is one that has very much 
been dominated by men thereby leaving women in the economically less advantageous 
positions. Hence, in this case we would assume that differences between countries 
regarding patriarchal gender attitudes are driven predominantly by the differences in 
agreement of men. Quite surprisingly, the empirical evidence contained in the answers to 
the above question firmly rejects the hypothesis of substantial male-female differences in 
attitudes to women’s work. To illustrate this finding, Figure 3 shows a scatter plot 
containing the national shares of ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ for woman (on the vertical 
axis) and for men (on the horizontal axis) for 29 countries covered in ISSP 1998. 
 
As the figure indicates, the gender-specific answers appear to lie on a straight line 
parallel to the 45° line. I run a simple linear regression through the data-points expressed 
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g- 18 - 
Agree female=  ß0+ ß1*Agree male 
 
Column 1 of Table 3 presents the result for the data points given in Figure 3.  
Table 3: OLS regression results with dependent variable percent of women agreeing and 
independent variable percent of men agreeing with patriarchal gender attitude 
Age group  All age 
groups  17-29  30-44  45-59  60- 
Men’s agreement  0.960  0.879  0.937  0.913  0.946 
  (0.035)**  (0.056)**  (0.063)**  (0.054)**  (0.070)** 
Constant  -3.9  -3.2  -3.5  -3.0  -2.1 
  (1.5)*  (2.0)  (2.4)  (2.5)  (4.2) 
No. countries  29  29  29  29  29 
R-squared  0.96  0.90  0.89  0.91  0.87 
Note: standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
 
The intercept of - 3.9 (constant) captures the average differences in agreement in 
percent points between women and men: surprisingly, within the sample of countries 
analysed women agree (and strongly agree) by a mere four percentage points less than 
men with the above statement. This difference is significant at the 5 per cent level and it 
is indeed anything but ‘substantial’. One might also suspect that the degree of 
disagreement between men and women differs systematically across countries, for 
instance in the sense that in countries where male ‘patriarchal attitudes’ are particularly 
pronounced, women are much less in favour of the traditional roles they ‘are bound to’ 
assume. However, as the slope of 0.96 - which is not significantly different from 1 
(p=0.26) – indicates, gender differences in agreement do not vary between countries with 
more and less traditional societal values on women’s work. 
The results of column 1 discussed until now reflect countries’ entire population. 
However, we might expect that gender differences in agreement vary between age 
groups. Women and men in older age groups might be more homogenous in their beliefs 
in traditional values than the younger generations. I therefore estimate women’s and 
men’s agreement with the statement for four different age groups for each country and 
run again the same regressions but this time through country points of different age 
groups. The results are given in columns 2 to 5 of Table 3. The slight decrease in the 
intercept over age groups indicates that gender differences seem to decline with older 
age. However, the difference between the gender gap of 3.2 percent for the youngest age - 19 - 
cohort (17 to 29) compared to 2.1 percent for the oldest age cohort (over 59) is not 
significant (t=0.23).  
Similar to the regression for all age groups (column 1), the slope is generally not 
significantly different from 1 for regression results by age group indicating that gender 
differences in agreement do not vary between countries with higher or lower patriarchal 
attitudes. However, one exception is the youngest age group where the slope of 0.879 is 
significantly smaller (4 percent level) than 1. Hence, in countries where young males’ 
patriarchal attitudes are greatest young women are less in favour of their traditional 
gender roles. However, the slopes for over 60 year-olds and for the youngest age group 
are not significantly different and there is no constant trend of increasing slope with 
higher age. Therefore, it is difficult to tell, whether the result of the youngest age group 
indicates a future trend that gender differences in patriarchal attitudes increase the more 
men adhere to traditional gender roles.  
Hence, the surprising pattern of women’s and men’s similar agreement with 
patriarchal attitudes is robust across different age cohorts.  
 
4.2  Regional differences in attitudes conditional on individuals’ characteristics 
The practice to measure traditional values by summarising people attributing themselves 
to gender stereotypes cannot take into account ‘pure’ (or ‘conditional’) effects that 
demographic variables have on individuals’ agreement with traditional gender roles. 
However, these pure effects are of interest since regional differences in agreement with 
the patriarchal gender attitude might partly be driven by regional diversity in terms of 
individual background characteristics. This Section estimates differences in gender 
attitudes between regions and countries controlling for varying individuals’ 
characteristics across regions. 
4.2.1  Research design 
Ordered logit (or probit) models
13 can measure the pure size effect of attitudes to 
gender inequality in regions and countries. The ordered logit models described in the 
following will also be applied similarly in Sections 2.5 (comparing the impact of socio-
                                                 
13 For the examination of factors determining attitudes to gender inequality I prefer logistic regressions instead of probit 
regression models since coefficients of logistic regressions are easier to interpret.  However, since the predicted 
probabilities of logit and probit regressions are very close, probit regressions could be used alternatively.  - 20 - 
economic background between genders and regions) and Section 6 (estimating changes in 
attitudes to gender inequality). 
 
Model 
I assume that the attitudes to family roles of individual i can be characterised by a 
latent variable 
*
i A  ranging from - ￿ to ￿. The structural model is as follows: 
(1)  i i i x A e b + =
* , 
whereby A* is the dependent variable indicating the degree of patriarchal gender 
values, ￿ is the vector of unknown coefficients, x the vector of explanatory variables and 
￿ the random term in the equation.  
The variable 
*
i A is not directly observed, but a variable  i A  taking values from 1 
to 5 decreasing in individual endorsement of traditional family roles. 
In particular, I measure the model 
(2) 
Ai =1 if  Ai
* £ m1 
Ai = 2 if  2
*
1 m m £ < i A  
    ... 
Ai = 5 if 
*
4 i A < m  
where  4 1,...,m m   are  unknown  threshold  parameters  to  be  approximated  with  the 
￿-coefficients. Assuming that the distribution of the error term is logistic, I estimate an 
ordered logit model.  
An alternative to the ordered logit model is the binary choice model by applying 
e.g.  a  logit  analysis.  In  such  a  model  the  dependent  variable  of  interest  (originally 
comprising 5 answer categories) would be collapsed into a dummy variable with e.g. a 1 
for answer categories ‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’ and 0 otherwise. (Such a model is 
applied  later  on  in  Section  5.3.)  On  one  hand  this  approach  leads  to  some  loss  of 
information since 5 different judgements about the gender attitude are summarised into 
just two categories. On the other hand it is reasonable to argue that the five different 
answer  categories  include  considerable  ‘noise’  since  the  percent  differences  between - 21 - 
countries regarding people adhering to categories like ‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’ might 
be mainly driven by different interpretations of the word ‘strongly’ in different languages.  
 
Independent variables used in the model 
Region and countries: It is assumed that all transition countries can be treated as a 
fairly homogeneous group. This may be justified to the extent that all share the common 
experience of socialism. A ‘CEE country dummy’ is introduced for measuring the ‘effect’ 
of transition countries.  
On the other hand, however, it might be reasonable to distinguish between Russia 
and the other Eastern European countries, all of which have strongly committed 
themselves to the Western market model by becoming official candidates for accession to 
or member states of the European Union. Russia differs also insofar as it has by far the 
longest history of communism, being the only country under communist rule before the 
world wars. To capture this I separate the CEE country dummy into one for Russia and 
one for the remaining eight transition countries (‘CEE8’). 
Besides regional dummy variables, countries’ adherence to patriarchal values can 
be estimated by single country dummies, even though the size and significance of which 
would certainly be influenced by international differences in the exact interpretation of 
the question, given the languages differences. 
Gender: Women are less likely to agree with patriarchal values as shown before. 
Age, education, cohabitation, single parenthood, household income, social class 
and religion: Literature show that individual resources and characteristics like higher 
education, lower age, cohabitation, single parenthood, higher household income, higher 
social class and low degree of religion are all related to more liberal attitudes. (Inglehart 
& Norris, 2003; Batalova & Cohen, 2002). 
Besides these individual resources, gender relations in the family household are 
likely to shape gender attitudes.
14 In households where gender relations are asymmetric, 
we can expect a presence of less egalitarian gender attitudes. Marital status, household 
                                                 
14 Asymmetric gender relation in the household might shape patriarchal attitudes. However, these variables 
might also have an endogenous character since patriarchal attitudes might determine women’s dependence 
in the household. One example might be, that couples with liberal gender values are more likely to cohabit 
before marriage. (Batalova & Cohen, 2002) - 22 - 
size, education, labour force participation, employment status and children in household 
are all variables that can capture women’s dependence on men. (Baxter and Kane, 1995) 
 
Integrating these variables into the model, I can specify the vector of explanatory 
variables x in (1) as follows 
 
(3)  i i i i i i i i i i Y R ES SES FS D G RE A e b b b b b b b b + + + + + + + + = ) (
*
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
where the variable RE denotes the region individuals are living in, G is people’s gender, 
D captures individual demography, FS refers to the family structure, SES captures the 
socio-economic status, ES is individuals’ employment status and R refers to people’s 
religious affirmation. In Section 2.6 where trends in gender attitudes are measured I also 
add a control capturing the year of the data (‘Y’).  e  is an error term and the vectors 
1 b to 8 b  are parameters. 
The aim of this paper is to examine the regional gap in patriarchal attitudes and 
where these regional differences derive from. The use of independent variables in the 
model serve for explaining regional differences but these variables are not considered to 
be of interest per se. Hence, no special focus is placed on developing  hypotheses of 
interest relating to the independent variables chosen for the model
15.  
The variables and their coding are described in Table 4. The variables household 
size, family structure (number of children and adults in the household), household income 
level  and  social  class  have  a  high  number  of  missing  values.  However,  since  these 
variables are very likely to be related to gender attitudes, they were used by including a 
dummy variable to indicate non-response
16. 
                                                 
15 Baxter and Kane (1995) and Batalova and Cohen (2002) examine the impact of many variables selected 
for the model in this analysis on gender attitudes of couples and in general focusing on a different set of 
countries.  
16 Missing values are too high for integrating the following variables into the regression: household 
structure, occupation, self-employment and area (rural/urban). - 23 - 
Table 4: Variables used and coding of variables 
  Term in 
formula  Used variables  Coding of variables 
A  Dependent 
variable 
Husband’s job to earn money, wife’s 
job to look after home and family 
1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 
3=neither nor, 4=disagree, 
5=strongly disagree 
Central and Eastern Europe   1= CEE, 0= otherwise 
CEE without Russia (CEE8)  1= CEE without Russia, 
0=otherwise 
Russia  1=Russia, 0=otherwise 
RE  Region 
OECD countries  Control group 
G  Gender  Gender of the respondent  0=male, 1=female 
Age (age)  Metric 
Divorced or separated  1 = divorced or separated, 0 = 
otherwise 
Widow / Widower  1=widowed, 0=otherwise 
Married  1= married, 0= otherwise 
D  Demography 
Single  Control group 
Single parent  Respondent single parent  1= single parent, 0= otherwise 
Cohabitation  Respondent is cohabiting   1= Living with steady life partner, 
0=otherwise (married or single) 
Household size  Household size /controlled for missing 
values  Metric 
FS 
Children  Children in the household  1=child in household, 0=otherwise 
Primary education  Control group (primary education 
or less) 
Secondary education  1= some or completed secondary 
education, 0=other 
Education 
Tertiary education  1=Some or completed tertiary, 
0=other 
Income  Household income /controlled for 
missing values  Metric (1 to 10 income categories) 
SES 
Social class  Subjective social class / controlled for 
missing values 
1=lower or working class, 
0=otherwise 
Full-time employed  Control group 
Retired   1 = retired, 0 = otherwise 
Part-time employed  1=part time employed, 0=otherwise 
Not in labour force (disabled, students, 
housewife or man, others)  1= not in labour force, 0= others 
ES  Employment 
status 
Unemployed  1 = unemployed, 0 = otherwise 
Religious degree   From 1= extremely religious to 
7=extremely not-religious  R  Religion 
Religious service (only if 1994 compared 
to 1998) 
From 1= once a week or more to 
6=never 
Y  Year  Year of ISSP wave  0=year 1994, 1= year 1998 
 
Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix present the summary statistics for the question 
and the independent variables discussed in the following Sub-section for CEE and OECD - 24 - 
countries separately. For some variables there is a considerable difference in respondents’ 
characteristics between regions. For example, about 10 percent more respondents in CEE 
than in OECD countries hold some secondary education
17 while about 5 percent more 
people in OECD than CEE countries attended tertiary education. In this context, it is 
important to note that educational attainment levels are difficult to compare across 
countries and regions due to institutional differences in how education is organised. The 
OECD sample comprises about five percent less retired people but seven to eight percent 
more housewives and part-time employed than the CEE sample. In addition, the share of 
the unemployed and those estimating themselves to be part of the lower societal class
18 is 
twice as high in transition as in Western industrialised countries. Income levels are 
measured by people’s estimates of their household income in their country’s currency. 
For each country I categorised these incomes into 10 different levels of the distribution of 
all sampled individuals in a country; the higher the level the higher is the individual’s 
household income. As can be expected, the average is around five in both regions.  
For four variables, ‘child in household’, ‘household income level’, ‘household 
size’ and ‘low social class’, dummy variables were introduced in order to control for high 
non-response to these questions. In OECD countries, for all variables besides household 
size information is missing for almost 20 percent and in CEE for between seven to 17 
percent of the sample.  
Table A 5 gives the correlation matrix of the explanatory variables. Correlation 
between the variables age and retirement (0.6) and children in household and household 
size (0.5) is considerably high. In general, correlation coefficients of the independent 
variables remain below 0.3. 
 
4.2.2  Results 
Table 5 displays the ordered logit regression results. (For the interpretation of 
results it is important to remember that the higher is the value of the dependent variable 
                                                 
17 Respondents were asked about their highest qualification, answers were summarised into primary, 
secondary and tertiary education with a similar country classification system than that used for ISCED 
levels. (ZA, 2000) 
18 The question on social class is as follows. ‘Which social class do you attribute yourself to?’ The 
percentage gives the share of people attributing themselves to the ‘lower class’ or ‘working class’ in 
contrast to the other answer categories ‘lower middle class’, ‘middle class’, ‘upper middle class’ and ‘upper 
class’.  - 25 - 
‘agreement with gender attitude’ the more liberal is the respondents’ attitude.) Models 1 
and 2 measure the regional ‘effect’ without control variables that are added in Models 3 
and 4. 
Results reflect patterns of Figure 1 showing that CEE countries are on average 
significantly more ‘traditional’ than OECD countries that serve as a control group in the 
ordered logit regression. The absolute difference in the size of the CEE country dummy 
coefficient is about 1.25 (Model 1). As expected, average predicted probabilities for 
agreement given in Table 6 show similarly to regional averages of agreement (see Figure 
1) that about 25 percent of people in OECD countries and as many as 54 percent of 
respondents in transition countries are predicted to agree with patriarchal gender norms 
on the division of work. 
Splitting the CEE country dummy variable into two confirms that people in 
Russia tend to be significantly (1 percent level) more traditional as regards gender roles 
(coefficient – 1.93, translates into predicted probability of 0.70 for agreement) than 
people in Central Europe (coefficient -1.1, predicted probability of 0.51 for agreement), 
who in turn continue to be more traditional than the OECD average (0.25 predicted 
probability for agreement).  - 26 - 
Table 5: Ordered logit regression results, dependent variable agreement with statement (the higher 
the value the less agreement with the patriarchal gender attitude) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
CEE  -1.244    -1.315   
  (0.022)***    (0.024)***   
CEE 8    -1.122    -1.202 
    (0.023)***    (0.026)*** 
Russia    -1.937    -1.970 
    (0.046)***    (0.051)*** 
Female      0.509  0.496 
      (0.023)***  (0.023)*** 
Age      -0.025  -0.024 
      (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
Divorced/separated      -0.009  0.008 
      (0.049)  (0.049) 
Widow      -0.148  -0.131 
      (0.054)***  (0.054)** 
Married      -0.093  -0.088 
      (0.034)***  (0.034)*** 
Household size      -0.085  -0.085 
      (0.010)***  (0.010)*** 
HH size missing      -0.725  -0.702 
      (0.058)***  (0.058)*** 
Secondary education      0.418  0.464 
      (0.028)***  (0.028)*** 
Tertiary education      0.963  1.005 
      (0.036)***  (0.036)*** 
Retired      -0.079  -0.142 
      (0.038)**  (0.038)*** 
Part-time employed      -0.031  -0.019 
      (0.038)  (0.038) 
Not in labour force      -0.299  -0.255 
      (0.031)***  (0.031)*** 
Unemployed      -0.093  -0.092 
      (0.047)**  (0.047)* 
Cohabitation      0.143  0.136 
      (0.045)***  (0.045)*** 
Child in household      -0.078  -0.077 
      (0.032)**  (0.032)** 
Single parent family      0.171  0.155 
      (0.078)**  (0.078)** 
Child missing      0.635  0.605 
      (0.036)***  (0.036)*** 
Household income      0.070  0.064 
      (0.005)***  (0.005)*** 
HH income level      -0.073  -0.067 
Missing      (0.028)***  (0.028)** 
Low social class      -0.156  -0.146 
      (0.025)***  (0.025)*** 
Class missing      0.303  0.303 
      (0.031)***  (0.031)*** 
Highly religious      -0.630  -0.595 
      (0.032)***  (0.032)*** 
Observations  31511  31511  30232  30232 
Pseudo R-squared  0.03  0.04  0.09  0.09 
log-lklhd  -48751.12  -48599.71  -43954.37  -43844.45 
Source: ISSP 1998, author’s calculations. 
Note: OECD countries reflect the benchmark and cover the following: Austria, Australia, Denmark, Italy, 
Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Swiss, USA and West-Germany. 
CEE countries are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, East-Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Slovakia and 
Slovenia Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. - 27 - 
Models 3 and 4 estimate the regional differences in agreement with patriarchal 
gender stereotypes conditional on individual background characteristics. Most of these 
individual determinants selected enter highly significantly and with the ‘right’ sign into 
the regression. Traditional attitudes are increasing in age and decreasing in income, social 
class and education. Men, the retired and the unemployed are more in favour of the 
traditional role system than their counterparts. 
Once individual characteristics are controlled for results indicate a slight but at the 
1 percent level significant
19 increases of the regional CEE dummy coefficient (Model 1 
compared to Model 3) and CEE8 (Model 2 compared to Model 4). However, Table 6 
reveals that these differences in the coefficients are marginal once expressed in predicted 
probabilities of agreement given mean characteristics of the whole population (OECD 
and CEE countries) for independent variables. Hence, controlling for population 
characteristics does not greatly change the result that patriarchal attitudes are much 
greater in transition than in OECD countries.  
 
Table 6: Predicted probabilities of agreement (strongly agree, agree) for models in Table 5 
  OECD  CEE 
countries 
CEE 8 
countries  Russia 
Model 1  0.252  0.538     
Model 2  0.251    0.507  0.699 
Model 3  0.234  0.532     
Model 4  0.234    0.504  0.686 
Note: predicted probabilities for agreement are calculated by assuming mean values of the whole 
population (OECD and CEE countries) for the independent variables.  
 
How does the ranking of countries regarding their traditional value systems 
(displayed in Figure 2) change once it is controlled for individual background 
characteristics across countries and regions? For this analysis, I replace the CEE-dummy 
with country dummies using Austria as the benchmark country. Table 7 summarises the 
results. Russia, Latvia, Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic 
remain the most patriarchal countries. In contrast, only the former communist countries 
Eastern Germany and Slovenia do not show significantly higher attitudes to gender 
                                                 
19 The increase of the coefficient for CEE countries from Model 1 to 3 and for Central Europe from Model 2 to 4 is 
significant with a t-value of around 3. Comparing the coefficient for Russia in Model 2 and 4 shows a significant 
difference in the coefficients with a t-value of 2.3. - 28 - 
inequality than the benchmark country Austria. Not surprisingly, Scandinavian countries 
are situated on the other end of the spectrum with most liberal values on gender attitudes.  






Russia  -1.823  0.068 
Latvia  -1.613  0.071 
Bulgaria  -1.402  0.075 
Poland  -1.284  0.074 
Slovakia  -1.253  0.070 
Hungary  -0.949  0.074 
Czech Rep.  -0.805  0.070 
West-Germany  -0.760  0.075 
Japan  -0.140  0.070 
Italy  -0.111  0.074 
Switzerland  -0.036  0.070 
Slovenia  0.021  0.164 
New Zealand  0.078  0.075 
Ireland  0.089  0.074 
East-Germany  0.089  0.075 
USA  0.347  0.073 
Portugal  0.399  0.077 
Australia  0.401  0.197 
Netherlands  0.609  0.063 
Norway  0.635  0.067 
Spain  0.754  0.159 
Sweden  0.913  0.073 
Denmark  1.367  0.078 
Source: ISSP 1998, author’s calculation. 
Note: benchmark country is Austria. Same control variables used as in Table 5. Pseudo R
2=0.12, log-
likelihood=-45497. Significant country parameters (5 percent level) are shaded grey, transition countries 
are printed bold. 
 
Taken together, even if controlled for population characteristics CEE countries 
show in general much higher patriarchal attitudes than Western European Countries. 
However, post-communist countries are very heterogeneous; Russia, Latvia and Bulgaria 
are definitely different from OECD countries, but Eastern Germany and Slovenia are 
comparable to Austria in their gender attitudes on women’s homemaker role. 
 
5  Where do regional and gender differences in attitudes to women’s 
work derive from? 
How can we explain the great regional differences in patriarchal gender attitudes? 
Furthermore, where do gender differences in agreement derive from and are they 
different between regions? This Section will examine these questions. 
 - 29 - 
5.1  Regional differences 
Up to now the regression model described in 2.4.2.1 was applied to a sample of OECD 
and CEE countries using a dummy variable for identifying the region of the individual. 
The assumption of this model was that individual determinants like education or income 
impact similarly on gender attitudes in both regions. However, this is not necessarily the 
case. In the following, regional differences in the importance of respondents’ 
characteristics for adherence to traditional gender attitudes are investigated by estimating 
regression models separately for the group of CEE and OECD countries. Hence, the 
regression model 3 of Table 5 is run separately for OECD and CEE countries 
(consequently excluding the regional dummy). Table 8 presents the results. Besides the 
impact of respondents’ characteristics on gender attitudes for both regions (OECD in 
column 1 and CEE in column 2) it also shows the regional difference in variables’ impact 
(difference of regional coefficients) and its standard error (column 3). Coloured fields 
denote that dissimilarities in impacts of population’s characteristics are significantly 
different between countries. Light grey colour indicates that the variable has a higher 
impact in OECD countries (whether in positive or negative direction); while dark grey 
colour denotes that the importance of the variable is more pronounced in CEE countries. 
Results show that background characteristics impact in the same direction for both 
regions, the OECD and CEE country group. Nevertheless, the comparison of the extent of 
variables’ impact on gender attitudes between East and West does provide some 
interesting and surprising insights. 
The gender dummy reveals that women in OECD countries agree significantly 
less with their male counterparts (1 percent level) on traditional gender roles than women 
in CEE countries conditional on respondents’ characteristics. This outcome stands in 
contrast to unconditional results given in Figure 3 that did not imply variation in gender 
differences in agreement with patriarchal attitudes between East and West. It is also 
noteworthy that conditional on respondent background gender differences in agreement 
with patriarchal attitudes are lower in the CEE country group with higher levels than in 
the OECD country group with low levels of these attitudes. This result motivates the 
examination of gender differences in attitudes and their determinants separately for 
regions in Section 5.2. - 30 - 
Table 8: Ordered logit regressions results by region, dependent variable agreement with statement 
(the higher the value the less agreement with the patriarchal gender attitude)  
 
  OECD  CEE 
countries 
Coefficient difference between OECD 
and CEE countries 
Female  0.574  0.381  0.193 
   (0.029)***  (0.038)***  (0.048)*** 
Age  -0.028  -0.013  -0.015 
   (0.001)***  (0.002)***  (0.002)*** 
Divorced/separated  0.072  -0.107  0.179 
   (0.061)  (0.086)  (0.105)* 
Widow  -0.212  -0.138  -0.074 
   (0.068)***  (0.093)  (0.115) 
Married  -0.122  -0.073  -0.049 
   (0.040)***  (0.062)  (0.074) 
Household size  -0.089  -0.083  -0.006 
   (0.012)***  (0.016)***  (0.020) 
HH size missing  -0.551  -0.263  -0.288 
   (0.062)***  (0.309)  (0.315) 
Secondary education  0.536  0.189  0.347 
   (0.034)***  (0.050)***  (0.060)*** 
Tertiary education  1.107  0.590  0.517 
   (0.043)***  (0.066)***  (0.079)*** 
Retired  -0.187  0.025  -0.212 
   (0.048)***  (0.064)  (0.080)*** 
Part-time employed  -0.076  -0.000  -0.076 
   (0.043)*  (0.082)  (0.093) 
Not in labour force  -0.329  -0.217  -0.112 
   (0.038)***  (0.056)***  (0.068)* 
Unemployed  -0.044  0.011  -0.055 
   (0.070)  (0.066)  (0.096) 
Cohabitation  0.212  -0.055  0.267 
   (0.055)***  (0.081)  (0.098)*** 
Child in household  0.072  -0.234  0.306 
   (0.042)*  (0.053)***  (0.068)*** 
Single parent family  0.194  0.015  0.179 
   (0.097)**  (0.136)  (0.167) 
Child data missing  0.481  0.982  -0.501 
   (0.045)***  (0.064)***  (0.078)*** 
HH income level  0.077  0.065  0.012 
   (0.006)***  (0.008)***  (0.010) 
HH income missing  -0.168  0.216  -0.384 
   (0.034)***  (0.051)***  (0.061)*** 
Low social class  0.044  -0.524  0.568 
   (0.033)  (0.041)***  (0.053)*** 
Class data missing  0.321  0.173  0.148 
   (0.035)***  (0.077)**  (0.085)* 
Highly religious  -0.693  -0.475  -0.218 
   (0.039)***  (0.055)***  (0.067)*** 
Observations  20145  10087   
Pseudo R2  0.08  0.05   
log-lklhd  -28694.99  -14829.77   - 31 - 
Note: results of this table are based on a similar regression model to that given in model 3 of Table 5 but 
this model here is run for OECD and CEE countries separatly. OECD countries are Austria, Australia, 
Denmark, Italy, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Swiss, USA and 
West-Germany. CEE countries are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, East-Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Russia, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. Source: ISSP 1998, author’s calculations. Note: standard errors in parentheses; * 
significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent, light grey colour denotes 
that impact is significantly more pronounced in OECD countries, dark grey colour indicates that 
characteristic is significantly more important in transition countries.  
 
Besides gender, Table 8 shows that higher age has a two times greater impact on 
the adherence to traditional values in the West than in the East. Since birth cohort 
differences can give some indices on changes in gender attitudes over time, Section 6 will 
investigate this issue further. 
Figure 4: Predicted probability of respondents to agree with patriarchal gender stereotype by 
































































































































































Source: ISSP 1998, author’s calculations 
Note: calculations are based on regional means for demographic variables of models 1 and 2 in Table 8. 
Agreement refers to answer categories ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’. 
 
The most important regional difference in determinants is education. Respondents 
with secondary and tertiary education disagree significantly more with the gender 
stereotype in both regions than the benchmark respondent with primary education. - 32 - 
However, education matters much more in terms of the magnitude of impact in OECD 
than in former communist countries at a significance level of 0.1 percent. The impact of 
secondary education (compared to primary education) on attitudes is three times and that 
of tertiary education two times smaller in the East than in the West.  
As an aid for estimating the lower impact of education on traditional values in the 
East, Figure 4 graphs the predicted probabilities for agreeing with the gender stereotype 
by educational level for both regions (bars) based on the regression model results of 
Table 8 (all other independent variables are set to the regional mean).  
In addition, changes in predicted probabilities are given for both regions (lines) as 
percentage decrease of agreement of the primary educated (set to 100). 
The predicted probability to agree with the patriarchal gender attitude for 
respondents with primary education is 0.58 and shrinks to 0.54 for secondary educated in 
the East. This decrease of predicted probabilities reflects a change of 8 percent (presented 
by the black line in Figure 4). In contrast, the decrease in the predicted probabilities for 
agreement from 0.33 (primary educated) to 0.22 (secondary educated) reflects a 35 
percent fall in the West (grey line). Even though 10 percent less tertiary than secondary 
educated agree with the gender stereotype in the East, once expressed in percent of the 
predicted probability for the primary educated the fall in agreement in the West remains 
still greater. Hence, better education in the West leads to greater abandonment of 
patriarchal attitudes than in the East. Or formulated differently: people with different 
education in the East are more homogenous in their beliefs in traditional values than the 
population in OECD countries.  
Social class does not have a significant impact on gender attitudes in the West but 
it has an as great impact as tertiary education in the East (the lower the social class the 
higher is adherence to traditional gender values) once controlled for individual 
characteristics.
20  
Retired people have (conditional on age) a greater adherence and single parents a 
smaller adherence to patriarchal values in the West while there are no sizable effects in 
the East. In addition, cohabitation leads to significantly higher liberal gender attitudes in 
                                                 
20 While this dummy variable is not correlated with a dummy on secondary education, the correlation is still 
moderate with a coefficient of -0.23 regarding tertiary education (Table A 5). - 33 - 
the West, but is not affecting gender stereotypes in the East. Differences between both 
regions are significant at the one percent level. This might confirm results of Batalova 
and Cohen (2002) indicating that cohabiting couples share housework more equally than 
married couples in the West while this ‘effect’ could not be found as distinct in several 
CEE countries.  
In transition countries respondents with children in the household are more 
traditional than other respondents but there is no similar pattern for the West. 
Taken together, three main results are of importance. First, in both regions 
individual characteristics impact generally in the same direction on the degree of tradition 
gender attitudes. However, there are some interesting differences in the explanatory 
power and size of those effects. Second, different individual backgrounds are of varying 
importance in the regions. Lower social class and children in the household leads to more 
traditional values in the East but have rather no importance in the West. However, in the 
West single parenthood and cohabitation have some impact on gender attitudes but there 
is no similarly significant pattern in the East. Third, the size of the impact seems to differ 
between regions. Without taking into account significant differences for variables that 
just control for missing values
21 there is a considerable higher number of ‘light grey’ 
fields, indicating that in general individual background factors have a bigger sizeable 
‘effect’ in the West than in the East. Especially education, retirement, religion and age 
gain a much higher explanatory power for differences in gender attitudes in the West than 
in the East. This indicates that people in CEE countries are more homogenous in their 
traditional beliefs than people with different background characteristics in Western 
industrialised countries.  
 
5.2  Gender differences 
This Sub-section aims at examining gender differences in the impact of individual 
background characteristics with the use of ordered logit regressions applied separately for 
men and women in East and West. Table 9 shows the results and presents for each region 
the gender difference of the ￿-coefficient with the standard error. Light grey fields 
indicate that males with the specific characteristic are more traditional than their female 
                                                 
21 For household size, children in household, household income and social class missing values were great, 
so that I controlled for missing values with the introduction of a dummy variable indicating non-response.  - 34 - 
counterparts (negative values), while dark grey fields show a greater female adherence to 
gender inequality (positive value). 
Results indicate that men who are married are not greatly different from single 
men in both regions. In contrast, in the East and the West married women adhere more to 
traditional gender attitudes on women’s work than single women. This might suggest that 
women who marry are in general more prone to patriarchal attitudes. Another explanation 
could be that marriage in itself changes women’s but not men’s attitudes to women’s 
work.  
A further regional similarity in gender differences of the impact of individuals’ 
characteristics regards those respondents who are not participating in the labour force. 
Again, men who are not in the labour force do not differ from (CEE country group) or are 
even more prone to liberal gender attitudes (OECD country group) than their full time 
working counterparts. In contrast, women who are not participating in the labour force 
are greatly in favour of patriarchal attitudes on women’s work compared to full-time 
working women. This ‘effect’ found for women might be endogenous, since women who 
think that it is the women’s job to stay at home are likely to decide against entering the 
labour force. However, it is noteworthy that women’s opportunity to stay at home might 
be quite limited in CEE where two earner incomes are often necessary for maintaining a 
household.  
Gender differences in the impact of individual characteristics differ across regions 
for all other variables besides marriage and labour force participation. Being divorced or 
separated compared to being single has a greater ‘effect’ on women than on men in the 
East but a similar pattern is not visible in the West. However, in OECD countries 
retirement and part-time employment are more related with patriarchal views for women 
than for men. A similar pattern cannot be found in transition countries. This regional 
difference corresponds with the finding that retirement was found to be significant for 
explaining gender attitudes only in the West (see Table 8). However, only about 5 percent 
of respondents in the CEE sample but 13 percent in the OECD sample is part-time 
employed (see Tables A 2.3 and A 2.4 in the Appendix) so that smaller sample sizes in 
the East might lead to the insignificant gender difference.  
 - 35 - 
Table 9: Ordered logit regression results by region and gender, dependent variable agreement with 
statement (the higher the value the less agreement with the patriarchal gender attitude) 
   OECD  Coefficient 
difference 
CEE countries  Coefficient 
difference 
  Male  female  Male-
female  male  female  Male-
female 
Age  -0.029  -0.025  -0.0040  -0.016  -0.013  -0.0030 
   (0.002)***  (0.002)***  (0.0028)  (0.003)***  (0.003)***  (0.0042) 
Divorced/separated  0.166  -0.006  0.172  0.132  -0.276  0.408 
   (0.092)*  (0.082)  (0.123)  (0.136)  (0.111)**  (0.176) 
Widow  -0.133  -0.260  0.127  0.047  -0.262  0.309 
   (0.128)  (0.084)***  (0.153)  (0.175)  (0.115)**  (0.209) 
Married  0.114  -0.224  0.338  0.134  -0.234  0.368 
   (0.060)*  (0.057)***  (0.083)***  (0.095)  (0.084)***  (0.127)*** 
Household size  -0.133  -0.058  -0.075  -0.074  -0.096  0.022 
   (0.018)***  (0.017)***  (0.025)***  (0.024)***  (0.022)***  (0.033) 
HH size missing  -0.499  -0.642  0.143  -0.180  -0.377  0.197 
   (0.089)***  (0.088)***  (0.125)  (0.474)  (0.408)  (0.625) 
Secondary education  0.601  0.500  0.101  0.165  0.200  -0.035 
  (0.051)***  (0.045)***  (0.068)  (0.077)**  (0.066)***  (0.101) 
Tertiary education  1.071  1.138  -0.067  0.548  0.603  -0.055 
   (0.062)***  (0.060)***  (0.086)  (0.101)***  (0.088)***  (0.134) 
Retired  -0.120  -0.435  0.315  0.026  0.013  0.013 
   (0.069)*  (0.072)***  (0.100)***  (0.099)  (0.085)  (0.130) 
Part-time employed  0.117  -0.270  0.387  0.147  -0.084  0.231 
   (0.078)  (0.056)***  (0.096)***  (0.139)  (0.102)  (0.172) 
Not in labour force  0.369  -0.656  1.025  0.077  -0.355  0.432 
   (0.070)***  (0.050)***  (0.086)***  (0.095)  (0.070)***  (0.118)*** 
Unemployed  0.048  -0.166  0.214  0.048  -0.012  0.060 
   (0.098)  (0.103)  (0.142)  (0.097)  (0.092)  (0.134) 
Cohabitation  0.129  0.312  -0.183  0.052  -0.162  0.214 
   (0.078)*  (0.078)***  (0.110)*  (0.121)  (0.110)  (0.164) 
Child in household  0.112  0.090  0.022  -0.230  -0.226  -0.004 
   (0.061)*  (0.058)  (0.084)  (0.079)***  (0.072)***  (0.107) 
Single parent  0.372  0.094  0.278  0.166  -0.003  0.169 
   (0.206)*  (0.112)  (0.234)  (0.379)  (0.149)  (0.407) 
Child missing  0.482  0.541  -0.059  0.948  1.034  -0.086 
   (0.064)***  (0.063)***  (0.090)  (0.095)***  (0.088)***  (0.129) 
HH income level  0.095  0.061  0.034  0.059  0.074  -0.015 
   (0.009)***  (0.008)***  (0.012)***  (0.013)***  (0.011)***  (0.017) 
HH income missing  -0.191  -0.148  -0.043  0.192  0.244  -0.052 
   (0.052)***  (0.045)***  (0.069)  (0.076)**  (0.069)***  (0.103) 
Low social class  0.052  0.042  0.010  -0.512  -0.528  0.016 
   (0.048)  (0.045)  (0.066)  (0.062)***  (0.055)***  (0.083) 
Class missing  0.304  0.355  -0.051  0.317  0.054  0.263 
   (0.051)***  (0.047)***  (0.069)  (0.117)***  (0.102)  (0.155) 
Highly religious  -0.660  -0.716  0.056  -0.483  -0.443  -0.040 
   (0.064)***  (0.050)***  (0.081)  (0.093)***  (0.068)***  (0.115) 
Observations  9292  10853    4530  5557   
Pseudo R-squared  0.07  0.09    0.04  0.05   
log-lklhd  -13583.30  -15011.47    -6546.33  -8255.60   
Note:  OECD  countries  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ Austria,  Australia,  Denmark,  Italy,  Ireland,  Japan,  New  Zealand,  Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Swiss, USA and West-Germany. ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ !￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ #￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ $￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ &￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ % ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ Source: ISSP 1998, author’s calculations 
 
It is noteworthy that the magnitude of gender differences is bigger for the West 
than for the East. This is similar to the pattern found for regional differences. Regional 
and gender differences in the impact of explanatory values show that the influence of - 36 - 
demographic factors in forming traditional values is generally lower in CEE than in 
OECD countries. This indicates that people in transition countries seem to be more 
homogenous in their traditional beliefs.  
 
5.3  Decomposition analysis 
Where do regional differences in gender attitudes derive from? First, they might 
be determined by differences in the population composition between regions. On one side 
Section 4.2 showed that the control for regional characteristics did not change greatly the 
regional gap between OECD and CEE countries regarding the agreement with patriarchal 
attitudes. This might indicate that regional differences in population characteristics are 
not of great importance. Nevertheless, as shown in Tables A 2.3 and A 2.4 in OECD 
countries more people complete tertiary education and less people are retired or attribute 
themselves to a low social class than in CEE. This composition in Western industrialised 
countries seems to be favourable in terms of liberal gender attitudes since low social 
class, retirement and lower education are related to higher traditional values in CEE (as 
discussed above). Hence, regional differences in gender attitudes might be partly due to 
variation in population composition between regions. 
Second, another explanation for attitude gaps could be the great regional 
differences in the impact of individual characteristics on patriarchal attitudes that were 
examined in Section 5.1.  
This Section examines the contribution of the two factors (first regional 
differences in population characteristics and second regional differences in the impact of 
these characteristics) on the regional gap of gender attitudes by estimating an Oaxaca 
decomposition that is described in Sub-section 5.3.1. Results are discussed in 5.3.2. 
 
5.3.1  Theoretical considerations 
The decomposition analysis, introduced by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973), 
offers a way of determining the extent to which any observed differences is a 
consequence of characteristic differences (e.g. in the West more people completed 
tertiary education than in the East) or the consequence of a different impact of 
characteristics (e.g. higher age has a greater impact on gender attitudes in the West than 
in the East).  - 37 - 
Gomulka and Stern (1990) extended the Oaxaca and Blinder method for 
decomposing group differences in means into an explained and residual component for 
group differences in probabilities for probit models.  
This analysis uses a logit model based on the following equation for CEE 
countries: 
 (1) 
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CEEX P b is the probability of person i in the CEE countries to agree 
or  strongly  agree  with  the  gender  stereotype, 
CEE b ˆ   is  the  vector  of  the  estimated 
coefficients and 
CEE
i X  is the associated vector of characteristics like socio-economic 
background and gender. A similar logit model is fitted for OECD countries.  
Using equation (1) the probability of agreement for each individual is calculated 
separately for East and West and then averaged for both regions. The regional differences 
in the average probabilities for agreeing with the patriarchal attitude Pr is then 
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(PRDif) can then be decomposed into the two components:  










OECD CEE X P X P X P X P b b b b - + - = -  
PrDif=      CT               +                              PT 
 
Hence,  I  make  use  of  the  OECD  coefficients  to  predict  the  CEE  countries’ 
average probability using the CEE countries characteristics.
22 The first term in square 
brackets (CT) is the contribution of the coefficients and the second term (PT) is the 
contribution  of  population  characteristics  to  the  total  differences  in  regional  average 
probabilities.  
                                                 




CEEX P b in (2) shows that the use of the CEE countries coefficients to predict the OECD 
probabilities leads to similar results. - 38 - 
Due  to  the  use  of  a  logit  model,  I  collapse  the  categorical  variable  with  five 
response categories into a binary variable as dependent variable with Ai= 0 / 1 whereby 
Ai=  1  if  respondents  agree  or  strongly  agree  with  the  traditional  statement  Ai=0 
otherwise. Independent variables are again those given in Table 4. 
 
5.3.2  Results 
Table A 6 in the Appendix presents parameters of the logistic regression model used for 
the  estimation  of  probabilities  by  regional  coefficients  and  population  characteristics 
displayed in Table 10.
23 Similar to results in previous Sections (see Table 6) OECD 
countries’ predicted probability of agreement with traditional gender stereotypes is 0.263 
and  it  is  about  twice  as  high  with  0.534  in CEE  countries.  Hence,  in  post-transition 
countries there is a 0.271 higher probability to agree with gender stereotypes (PrDif). If the 
impact  of  determinants  in  CEE  countries  were  that  of  OECD  countries  (￿OECD)  the 
probability of agreement in post-communist countries would be rather similar to that in 
OECD  countries  (0.265).  On  the  other  hand,  if  we  applied  the  coefficients  of  CEE 
countries to the sample of OECD countries, the degree of agreement in OECD countries 
(￿CEE)  would  be  slightly  lower  than  in  transition  countries  (0.491).  Hence,  it  is  the 
different  impact  of  coefficients  (CT=0.269)  that  explain  differences  between  regions, 
whereby differing populations characteristics have a rather negligible explanatory power 
(PT=0.002). 
 
Table 10: Decomposition analysis showing probabilities depending on regional coefficients and 
characteristics 
  ￿OECD  ￿CEE 
XOECD  0.263  0.491 
XCEE  0.265  0.534 
Source: ISSP 1998, authors’ own calculations 
 
It is noteworthy that unobserved variables not included in the model might drive 
results of the Oaxaca decomposition through the constant term. Especially in case a 
                                                 
23 There are slight differences between results of Tables 2.6 and 2.10 even though results are based on a 
similar assumption of determinants of agreement Table 2.6 shows results of an ordered logit model while 
Table 2.10 gives results of a binary logistic model (parameter results given in Table A 6) for the Oaxaca 
decomposition. In Table 2.6 the predicted probabilities are estimated by setting independent variables to the 
mean of both regions.  - 39 - 
variable were excluded that is very important for explaining differences in agreement in 
transition but not in OECD countries or vice versa results of the decomposition analysis 
would be different. However, it is very difficult to judge the inclusiveness of the model 
used. The low pseudo R
2 of the regression results (see Table A 6 in the Appendix) 
indicates that other factors besides gender, family structure, demography, socio-economic 
status, employment status and religion are at work. Hence, the results of the Oaxaca 
decomposition need to be viewed with some caution. 
What does it mean in practical terms regarding the further development of liberal 
values in both regions that it is not differences in population characteristics but in their 
impacts that drive the great regional gender attitude gap? Assuming that regression 
results were valid also in the future, an increase of people with higher education, lower 
average age etc. would decrease traditional values in OECD countries significantly but 
not so much in CEE countries. Even if people are very different in their characteristics 
within CEE countries they seem to be more homogenous in their traditional beliefs in 
post-communist countries than people with different background characteristics in 
Western industrialized countries. Hence, while in the West traditional values are 
contested between different population groups, gender stereotypes are a common and 
widely accepted feature among people in post-communist countries.  
Given the much lower impact of individual background factors, increases of 
liberal gender views over time might be lower in post-communist countries. How 
patriarchal values might be changing by region over time will be the focus of the next 
Section. 
 
6  How will gender-role attitudes change over time in the East and 
West? 
Explanations for changes of gender stereotypes over time are mainly twofold but 
interlinked. First, changes in attitudes might simply reflect the trend, that older, more 
traditional generations are replaced by younger, more egalitarian-minded ones (‘cohort 
succession’). Hence, these changes can be measured by comparing attitudes between 
different birth cohorts. Section 6.1 examines these changes in attitudes. (This Section 
focuses on age groups instead of birth cohorts. Since both are perfectly correlated once - 40 - 
only one time point (data for 1998) is used results are the same whether the focus is on 
birth cohorts (e.g. born between 1974 and 1980) or age group (18 to 24 year-olds).)  
However, the examination of age group or birth cohort effects does not take into 
account that there might be a deeper underlying value shift among the populations in 
form of a gradual change across all populations segments. (Rice & Coates, 1995) For 
CEE countries an important argument in favour of this value shift might be that the 
impact of transition did not only change people’s lives in the economic sphere but had 
also a direct influence on individuals’ cultural and societal norms. For catching this 
effect, Section 6.2 compares cross-sectional data collected in the ISSP waves for the 
rather short time period from 1994 to 1998. 
 
6.1  Change over time estimated by different attitudes of age groups 
A precondition for the measurement of changes over time by using solely age 
groups is the assumption that social trends have only a marginal effect on cultural norms 
but that, through the socialization process, the experience of predominant conditions 
during the formative years of childhood and early adolescence make an indelible 
impression on people. (Ingelhart & Norris, 2003) Even if certain decisive events can alter 
gender attitudes in age groups the underlying assumption of this Section is that most 
predominantly values held in later life can be attributed to experiences in early years. 
(This assumption will be relaxed in Section 6.2.) 
It is also important to note that attitudes in the next decade will be an average 
across birth cohorts that are covered in ISSP 1998 data, but also future cohorts that 
cannot yet be observed. In the following analysis it is assumed that the changes of 
attitudes over birth cohorts are constant so that it is possible to predict future birth 
cohorts’ attitudes. Nevertheless, we cannot be sure that current trends in changes of 
attitudes will reflect also those of future cohorts.  - 41 - 
Figure 5: Share of respondents agreeing (agree + strongly agree) with traditional gender roles by age group 






































































































Source: ISSP 1998 
Note: OECD and CEE country group agreement refers to unweighted average of country figures. OECD 
countries  are  Australia,  Austria,  Denmark,  Ireland,  Italy,  Japan,  Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA and West-Germany. CEE countries are Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, East-Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
 
Figure 5 presents the share of respondents agreeing (agree + strongly agree) with 
the traditional gender-role statement for different age groups and regions. The graph does 
not only display the already examined higher liberal values in OECD countries but 
reveals also the much more pronounced increase in agreement with rising age in the West 
compared to the East (see regression results on the variable ‘age’ given in Table 8 by 
region). In OECD countries 40 percent points more people in the oldest age group agree 
(75 + year-olds) with the gender stereotype compared to the youngest group (18 to 24 
year-olds). These differences are less than 30 percent points in CEE countries. Figures A1 
and A2 in the Appendix show the share of respondents agreeing with the statement for 
each transition country covered in ISSP separately.  
Transition countries appear to be heterogeneous regarding the impact of age on 
traditional values. Impacts of age on patriarchal attitudes are similar between (pre-1990) 
OECD countries and East-Germany, Slovenia and Poland (see Figure A1 in the 
Appendix). Very different to these countries is the agreement between age groups in - 42 - 
Russia, Bulgaria and Latvia (see Figure A2 in the Appendix). In all three countries only 
20 percent points more elderly than youngsters agree with the tradition gender statement. 
Hence, expressed in absolute differences age has a twice as high impact in Western 
European countries (with 40 percent points difference) than in these three transition 
countries.  
Changes of attitudes across birth cohorts are likely to reveal time trends of 
societal traditional value adherence. Greater variation in agreement between cohorts in 
one country is probable
24 to result in a greater shift of traditional values to liberal values 
by cohort succession over time (since much more traditional cohorts are taken over from 
younger much less traditional cohorts). In order to estimate changes over time within 
countries I run an OLS regressions through the data points given in Figure 5 and in 
Figures A1 and A2 for each country separately. Hence, a group’s (c) agreement (agree + 
strongly agree) (Ac) with the gender stereotype is the dependent variable and age groups 
are the continuous independent variable
25. The following equation clarifies the simple 
regression model used: 
 
(1)  Ac= ￿0+ ￿1*age group 
 
The ‘age group’ variable is continuous with the units of measurement ranging 
from 1 to 12; 1 denotes the youngest age group, 18 to 24 year-olds (or youngest birth 
cohort with those born between 1974 and 1980), 12 the oldest age group (above 75) or 
birth cohort. In this model it is not controlled for any other respondents’ characteristics. 
The resulting slope given by the ￿1-coefficient captures the increase of the share of 
people agreeing with patriarchal gender attitudes for each older age group or birth cohort 
(that comprises 5 years).
26 Table A 7 in the Appendix shows the regression results for all 
transition countries separately and for the pooled OECD sample. In OECD countries the 
constant and the ￿-coefficient are both about 4 points. This implies an 8 percent 
                                                 
24 An important assumption is that changes over age groups prevail also in future age groups for that 
attitudes cannot yet be measured.  
25 The age group variable is continuous since one age group covers respondents born in 5 consecutive 
years. 
26 I hereby assume a linear relationship between agreement and age cohort which seems true given results 
of descriptive statistics presented in Figures A1 and A2 in the Appendix. - 43 - 
agreement of 18 to 24 year-olds (intercept value+1*4) and a 4 percent increase with each 
older age group. For example, 12 percent of 25 to 29 year-olds and about 52 percent of 
the last age group (75 + year-olds) are predicted to agree.  
Figure 6 shows the so calculated ￿-coefficient for each country on the x-axis and 
the agreement (agree + strongly agree) for the whole society on the y-axis.  
In OECD countries higher agreement with traditional values is positively 
correlated with a greater variation between age groups (correlation coefficient between 
societal agreement and change 0.39). Hence, in Western industrialised countries the gap 
between more traditional and less traditional countries will decrease over time (assumed 
that current trends in attitude changes observed across current birth cohorts will reflect 
also those of future cohorts). The extreme case is Ireland, where a great agreement with 
patriarchal attitudes in the population of 38 percent is likely to shrink rapidly over time, 
since there is a fall in agreement of 6 percent points from one age group to the 
consecutive younger age group. Sweden is the other extreme, where a very low 
agreement with patriarchal values in the society (10 percent) is paired with a low 
decrease in agreement over age groups (1 percent) indicating that agreement with the 
patriarchal statement will change very slowly in this country.  
Figure 6: Relation between changes of traditional values by age groups and the percentage of people 
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Source: ISSP 1998, author’s calculations 
Note: the y-axis shows the percentage of people in a county that agree or strongly agree with the statement 
that women should stay at home. The x-axis shows the country-specific slope of the curve (see Figures A - 44 - 
2.1 and A 2.2 in Appendix) regarding the increase of traditional values for each age group that comprises 5 
years.  
 
In contrast, the trend is the other way round in transition countries (correlation 
coefficient -0.61). These transition countries that are highly traditional in terms of gender 
attitudes are also those countries where changes of attitudes take place slowly. The large 
average agreement with the gender stereotype of 70 percent in Russia is difficult to 
overcome given that there is only an about 1 percent point difference in agreement 
between each age group. Attitudes to gender inequality are also very probable to persist 
in Bulgaria and Latvia over time. On the other hand, Poland with an average agreement 
of 60 percent and Hungary with 50 percent show a relative high change in traditional 
values over groups. This indicates that these countries are very likely to follow the path 
of greater gender equality in the future. Hence, in contrast to OECD countries the gap in 
gender attitudes between transition countries is likely to increase over time. In addition, 
given that attitudes change faster in OECD than in transition countries in terms of age 
group succession, additionally the East-West gap in gender attitudes is likely to increase.  
However, an important assumption of these predictions is that the trend of 
changes observed across current birth cohorts remains stable also for future cohorts.  
 
6.2  Changes of gender attitudes between 1994 and 1998 
The cross-sectional focus on changes in gender attitudes cannot disentangle 
generational effects (cohort succession) from life-cycle effects that may alter attitudes as 
people move from youth to middle age and to retirement. Two waves of the ISSP survey 
serve as an alternative estimation of these life-cycle effects. Given that comprehensive 
data are only available for the years 1994 and 1998 life cycle effects need to be huge for 
being visible in this short period of time. However, since the transition process was a 
decisive historical event changing people’s political and economical environment 
dramatically, societal changes might be at stake in this region in the 1990s. If changes in 
attitudes to gender inequality are as big as changes in the economic and political sphere 
four years of differences might already be sufficient for showing trends in gender 
attitudes.
27 
                                                 
27 In addition, changes in trends measured from 1994 to 1998 are also likely to reflect the before discussed 
change from on age cohort to the next, since the time span of one age cohort was set to 5 years. - 45 - 
Figure 7 presents the changes of agreement (agree + strongly agree) with gender 
stereotypes for some CEE countries in comparison to three OECD countries between the 
years 1988 and 1998: Norway with a low, Austria with a moderate and the Philippines 
with a high average consent on gender stereotypes.  
Results indicate that there is little change in agreement with the gender stereotype 
in Russia, Bulgaria and the Philippines between 1994 and 1998. These are the countries 
in which changes in traditional values between age groups were very small, too (see 
previous Section). With the exception of Eastern Germany in all other countries attitudes 
to gender inequality were decreasing in the time period of four or eight years. From 1991 
to 1998 greatest changes in agreement seem to appear in Austria and Hungary. Both 
countries were characterised with a relative high variation in gender attitudes between 
age groups (Figure 6). 
Nevertheless, in Hungary from 1988 to 1991 and in Eastern Germany from 1994 
to 1998 data suggest an increase in traditional values that is difficult to explain. 
Differences in gender attitudes over years might derive from different population 
characteristics between countries and years, even though great changes over time are 
rather unlikely. Nevertheless, I estimate the ‘conditional’ effect of the year change by 
applying ordered logit regression described already in 2.4.2.1 with the additional use of a 
dummy variable for years (year 1994 set to 0, year 1998 set to 1) and interaction variables 
for years and regions.
28  
                                                 
28 In this analysis data refer solely to the 12 OECD and seven CEE countries that were covered in both 

































































































































Figure 7: Percentage of people who agree or strongly agree with the patriarchal gender attitude by 
country and year 
Source: ISSP 1988, 1991, 1994 and 1998. Countries are ordered first by region and second by agreement in 
1998 
 
Table 11 presents only these results important for examining changes over years 
(the remainder of the regression results is reported in Table A 8 in the Appendix). The 
control group are respondents in year 1994 in OECD countries. 
In all models of Table 11 the year dummy shows a highly significant positive 
value indicating that in 1998 patriarchal attitudes are less predominant than in 1994. This 
result confirms unconditional results of Figure 7. In order to examine whether there is a 
different decrease in gender attitudes between regions over time I introduce interaction 
variables in Model 3 (capturing differences between OECD countries as a control group 
and CEE countries) and 4 (comparing OECD countries with Russia and the six remaining 
CEE countries).  - 47 - 
Table 11: Changes of attitudes to gender inequality over years? Ordered logit. 1994 and 1998 data. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
0.221  0.235  0.242  0.210  Year 1998  (0.029)***  (0.029)***  (0.032)***  (0.032)*** 
-1.076    -1.044    CEE countries  (0.020)***    (0.029)***   
    -0.058    CEE countries in 
1998      (0.038)   
  -1.253    -1.300  cee6    (0.021)***    (0.031)*** 
  -2.137    -2.111  Russia    (0.042)***    (0.059)*** 
      0.084  cee6 in 1998        (0.039)** 
      -0.055  Russia in 1998        (0.081) 
Observations  40612  40612  40612  40612 
Pseudo R-squared  0.08  0.10  0.08  0.10 
log-lklhd  -59610.03  -58454.03  -59608.85  -58451.21 
Source: ISSP 1994, 1998, author’s own calculations 
Note: regression model similar to that applied for estimations in Table 5. This table shows only the results 
for the year and regional variables and their interaction; see Table A 8 in Appendix for full results. OECD 
countries refer to Australia, Austria, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
UK, USA and West-Germany; CEE countries are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Eastern Germany, Hungary, 
Poland, Russia and Slovenia.  
 
The ‘CEE countries in 1998’ dummy proves not to be significant, indicating that 
there is no noteworthy difference between OECD and transition countries in the decline 
of adherence to traditional values during both years (Model 3). Once transition countries 
and Russia are split up (Model 4), also the ‘Russia in 1998’ dummy does not show any 
significant effect in time changes. However, the dummy for the remaining six transition 
countries becomes significant (5 percent level) with a positive value. This result suggests 
a slight trend of decreasing traditional values in the transition countries of Eastern 
Germany, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland and Bulgaria once pooled together 
and compared to the OECD country sample. Nevertheless the ‘effect’ is rather small in 
magnitude (0.084)
29 given that it is still 15 times lower than the difference in patriarchal 
attitudes between OECD and transition countries (-1.300) and covers a 4 year time 
period.
30 Furthermore, a significance level of 5 percent is not very impressive given the 
high sample size.  
                                                 
29 The effect vanished once a second dummy variable for Bulgaria is introduced.  
30 One possibility for estimating the impact of the small coefficient is to guess roughly how much time this 
group of transition countries would need for catching up with the relative low adherence to gender - 48 - 
Taken together, results suggest that traditional values in post-communist countries 
will not be overcome as quickly as in Western industrialised countries. If we assume that 
traditional gender values are decisively moulded by early adolescence experience the 
relation between age groups and agreement with gender values shows indeed that though 
there is a higher traditional believe in gender roles in post-transition countries this will be 
transformed slower into liberal beliefs than in Western industrialised countries. Hence, 
the gap between the East and West regarding the adherence to traditional values on 
women’s work might even increase. However, transition countries are very 
heterogeneous: changes to liberal gender attitudes are more unlikely in Russia, Bulgaria 
and Latvia where attitudes on gender inequality are very pronounced than in Poland, 
Slovakia and Hungary where societies adhere much less to traditional beliefs. This 
indicates, that the gap in traditional beliefs between transition countries is likely to 
increase.  
Based on attitudes in two time intervals, 1994 and 1998, results show a slight but 
not very significant trend that especially in Central European countries value changes 
have taken place more pronounced than in Western industrialised countries. In case this 
effect is persistent over greater time periods the widening gap between East and West in 
terms of patriarchal attitudes forecasted by birth cohort succession might be diminished.  
 
7  Conclusion 
Economic indicators on women’s access to tertiary education, women’s 
employment share and the gender pay gap revealed a similar level of gender equality in 
the labour force for East and West. This stands in contrast to the regional differences in 
what people actually think on women’s societal role: a strikingly higher share of people 
in the East than in the West believe that women should be homemakers and men 
breadwinners. In Russia - the country with the longest history of communism – as many 
as 70 percent of the population judges women’s job to be at home. This prevalence of 
traditional attitudes to women’s work is more than twice as high as in a pooled sample of 
                                                                                                                                                   
inequality predominant in OECD countries: not before the next 60 years (15 * 4). Nevertheless, this 
prediction over a long time period is only based on two data sets covering a four year trend and needs 
therefore to be interpreted with caution. - 49 - 
Western industrialised countries. In Sweden agreement with patriarchal values is 
significantly lower than in every other transition or OECD country covered by the data.  
It is not population characteristics that determine the great gap in gender attitudes 
found between East and West. But different impacts of population characteristics explain 
the regional divergences in gender attitudes as was shown by applying an Oaxaca 
decomposition analysis. People in the East appear to be quite homogeneous in their 
strong patriarchal beliefs that are mainly unaffected by their socio-economic background. 
Patriarchal values in the West, quite the reverse, are predominantly shaped by individual 
background. Hence, results suggest that an increase in education would diminish 
patriarchal values substantially in the West, but would not necessarily have an as great 
effect on societal norms in the East. 
Results of ordered logit regressions run separately for OECD and transition 
countries indicate a much greater impact of education, female full-time employment, 
gender, retirement and age shaping attitudes in the West than in the East. In addition, 
some different individual backgrounds gain varying importance in the regions. Single 
parenthood and cohabitation leads to more liberal gender attitudes only in OECD 
countries. On the other hand, only in former communist countries lower social class, 
children in the household and being married account for more traditional values. 
Surprisingly, gender differences in agreement with gender stereotypes on work 
are anything but substantial and seem not to be related to the degree of patriarchal 
attitudes in the society. This proves also to be true once controlled for population 
characteristics. However, gender differences in determinants of attitudes are much greater 
in the West than in the East. Part-time employment and retirement has a significantly 
greater ‘effect’ on patriarchal attitudes for the female than for the male population in the 
West. There is no comparable pattern in the East.  
Since there is a huge regional gap in patriarchal attitudes it is important to 
estimate how preferences for gender-roles will change over time. First, I assumed that 
changes in attitudes simply reflect the trend that older more traditional generations are 
replaced by younger, more egalitarian minded ones. Comparing OECD with transition 
countries shows that agreement with patriarchal values is more conform between age 
groups in the East than in the West. Hence, the regional gap in patriarchal values might - 50 - 
even increase between transition and OECD countries since liberal values are 
accumulating more quickly in the West than in the East. For OECD countries results 
suggest that those countries with an on average high agreement with the gender 
stereotype show greater variation between age groups. This indicates that the gap 
between OECD countries regarding patriarchal values will decline over time. The 
contrary is true for transition countries. Those countries that are most in favour of gender 
inequality show also the highest conformity between age groups. The average agreement 
with the gender stereotype of 70 percent in Russia and Bulgaria is difficult to overcome 
given that there is only an about 1 percent point difference in agreement between age 
groups (that comprise 5 years of age difference).  
Nevertheless, the transition process might have lead to a deeper underlying value 
shift among the whole population. This is measured by comparing attitudes between the 
years 1994 to 1998. Results show a very slight trend for predominantly Central European 
transition countries that value changes have taken place more pronouncedly in the East 
than in the West. However, the effect is very small in magnitude and not very significant. 
Nevertheless, if this trend is persistent over greater time periods it might diminish the 
widening gap between the West and East forecasted by just focusing on birth cohort 
succession.  
The high adherence to patriarchal values regarding women’s work as well as their 
probable persistence over time are of a great concern for CEE countries. These attitudes 
are likely to impact upon labour market policies and people’s (e.g. employers’) 
behaviour. Therefore, they will probably shape women’s opportunities in labour market. 
Hence it is astonishing, that the high patriarchal attitudes to women’s work cannot be 
revealed once focusing on economic indicators. One reason might be that economic 
factors discussed do not capture the already existing gap between East and West in 
gender equality in the labour market that the analysis of attitudes revealed. Another 
explanation is, that economic indicators still show the inherited ‘gender equality’ in the 
labour market having been forced upon the society during communism. In this case, 
societal agreement on patriarchal values is very likely to change labour market structures 
and decrease women’s opportunities in transitional labour markets over time.- 51 - 
References 
Badgett M.V., P. Davidson, N. Folbre and J. Lim (2000), ‘Breadwinner Dad, Homemaker 
Mom: An interdisciplinary Analysis of Changing Gender Norms in the United States, 
1977-1998’, http://www-unix.oit.umass.edu/~folbre/folbre/pdf/change10r.pdf 
 
Batalova, J. and P. Cohen. (2002), ‘Premarital Cohabitation and Housework: Couples in 
Cross-National Perspective’, Journal of Marriage and Family, Vol. 64, pp. 743-755. 
 
Baxter J. and E. Kane (1995), ‘Dependence and Independence – a cross-national Analysis 
of gender inequality and gender attitudes’, Gender & Society, Vol. 9(2), pp. 193-215. 
 
Blau F. and L. Kahn (2001), ‘Understanding international differences in the gender pay 
gap’, nber Working Paper, No. 8200. 
 
Blinder A. S. (1973), ‘Wage Discriminating: Reduced Form and Structural Variables’, 
Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 8, pp. 436-455. 
 
Blossfeld H.P. and S. Drobnic, eds. (2001), Careers of couples in contemporary 
societies: a cross-national comparison of the transition from male breadwinner to dual-
earner families, New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Brainerd, E. (1997), ‘Women in Transition: Changes in Gender Wage Differentials in 
Eastern  Europe  and  the  Former  Soviet  Union’, 
http://www.lisproject.org/publications/liswps/171.pdf 
 
Braun, M, N. Lewin-Epstein and H. Stier (1999), ‘Systemic and Cultural Determinants of 
Gender-Role Attitudes’, in N. Tos, P. Mohler and B. Malnar (eds.), Modern Society and 
Values, Ljubljana: University of Ljubljana and ZUMA.  
 
Crouch C. (1999), Social Change in Western Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Dechter, A and P. Smock (1994), ‘The fading breadwinner role and the economic 
implications for young couples’, Institute of Research on Poverty Discussion Paper, No. 
1051-94. 
 
Dijkstra, A. (1997), ‘Women in Central and Eastern Europe: A Labour Market in 
Transition’, in A. Dijkstra and J. Plantenga (eds.), Gender and Economics: A European 
Perspective, London: Routledge, pp 118-135. - 52 - 
 




Frankel J. (ed.) (1997), Families of employed mothers: an international perspective, New 
York: Garland Pub. 
 
Gomulka J. and Stern N. (1990), ‘The Employment of Married Women in the United 
Kingdom 1970-1983’, Economica, Vol. 57, pp. 171-199.  
 
Inglehart R. and P. Norris (2003), Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change 
Around the World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Lobodzinska B. (1995), Family, Women and Employment in Central-Eastern Europe, 
Greenwood Publishing Group, London: Greenwood Press. 
 
Munich D., J. Svejnar J. and K. Terrell (1999), ‘Returns to human capital under the 
communist wages grid and during the transition to a market economy’, Journal of 
Comparative Economics, Vol. 27, pp. 33-60. 
 
Newell, A. and B. Reilly (1996), The Gender Wage Gap in Russia: Some Empirical 
Evidence, Labour Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 337-356. 
 
Oaxaca R. L. (1973), ‘Male-Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labour Markets’, 
International Economic Review, Vol. 14, pp. 529- 536. 
 
OECD (2002), Employment Outlook 2002, OECD, Paris. 
 
Panayotova, E. and A. Brayfield (1997), ‘National context and gender ideology. Attitudes 
toward women’s employment in Hungary and the United States’, Gender & Society, Vol. 
11 (5), pp. 627-655. 
 
Tu S. and Y. Chang (2000), ‘Women’s and Men’s Gender Role Attitudes in Coastal 
China and Taiwan’, http://www.sinica.edu.tw/as/survey/pdf/osr-asr200206.pdf 
 
UNESCO (2003), Global Education Digest 2003. Comparing Education Statistics Across 
the World, UNESCO. 
 - 53 - 
UNICEF (1999), Women in transition, Regional Monitoring Report, No. 6, UNICEF 
Innocenti Research Centre, Florence. 
 
ZA 2000, Codebook ZA Study 3190, ISSP 1998, Religion II, Zentralarchive für 
Empirische Sozialforschung, http://www.social-science-gesis.de. - 54 - 
Appendix 
 






size  Field work  Sample 
Austria  60.7  1002  Face-to-face  Stratified multi-stage random 
sample 
Australia  Na  1310  Na  Na 
Bulgaria  94.1  1102  Face-to-face  Two stage randomised clustered 
sample 
Canada   29.1  974  Self-completion Mail, 
one reminder  Stratified random sample 
Czech Republic  39.6  1223  Face-to-face  Three stage random stratified 
sample 
Denmark  64.0  1114  Face-to-face  Stratified random sample 
France  10.3  1133  Mail, no reminder  Stratified random sample 
Germany West  60.1  1000 




Multistage random sample 
Hungary  52.2  1000  Face-to-face  Three stage random stratified 
sample 
Ireland  Na  1010  Na  Na 
Italy  73.7  1369  Face-to-face  Na 
Japan  80.4  1368  Self-completion  Two-stage stratified random sample 
Latvia  83.4  1200  Face-to-face  Multi-stage stratified sample 
Netherlands  96.1  2020  Face-to-face  Random sample 
New Zealand  64.9  998  Mail survey with four 
waves  Random sample 
Norway  61.6  1532 
Mail-survey, one 
reminder, two follow 
ups 
Stratified random sample 
Poland  67.2  1147  Face-to-face  Multi stage random sample 
Portugal  79.7  1201  Face-to-face  Random sample 
Russia  52.9  1703  Face-to-face  Multi-stage stratified random 
sample 
Slovenia  35.3  1006  Face-to-face  Stratified random sample 
Slovakia  Na  1284  Face-to-face  Stratified random sample 
Spain   96.0  2488  Face-to-face  Stratified random sample 
Sweden  59.7  1189  Postal survey with two 
reminders  Stratified random sample 
Switzerland  Na  1204  Telephone interviews  Random sample 
UK merged 
Great Britain  45.3  804  Multi-stage random sample 
Northern Ireland  Na  812 
Face-to-face + self-
completion 
questionnaire  Na 
USA  68.6  1284  Face-to-face  Multistage probability sample 
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Russia ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Bulgaria ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Poland ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Latvia ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Slovakia ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Germany West ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Hungary ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Czech Rep ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Portugal ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Austria ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Japan ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Italy ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Germany East ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Slovenia ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Ireland ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Switzerland ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Australia ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
New Zealand ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Spain ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
USA ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
UK ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Denmark ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Netherland ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Norway ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Sweden ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
Note: refers to significance at 1 percent level. Without Bonferroni adjustment. 
 
￿not statistically significant difference 
￿country in row significantly smaller agreement with gender stereotype than country in column 
￿country in row significantly higher agreement with gender stereotype than country in column 
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Table A3: Summary statistics for OECD countries based on ISSP 1998 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Gender stereotype  21040  3.500  1.338  1  5 
Female  21320  0.534  0.499  0  1 
Age  21291  45.931  17.356  16  95 
Divorced/separated  21248  0.069  0.254  0  1 
Widow  21248  0.074  0.262  0  1 
Married  21248  0.605  0.489  0  1 
Household size  21344  2.956  1.451  1  13 
HH size missing  21344  0.069  0.253  0  1 
Secondary education  21255  0.522  0.500  0  1 
Tertiary education  21255  0.217  0.412  0  1 
Retired  21220  0.180  0.384  0  1 
Part-time employed  21220  0.125  0.330  0  1 
Not in labour force  21220  0.098  0.297  0  1 
Unemployed  21220  0.040  0.196  0  1 
Cohabitation  21344  0.066  0.248  0  1 
Child in household  21344  0.301  0.459  0  1 
Single parent  21344  0.023  0.149  0  1 
Child missing  21344  0.194  0.395  0  1 
Household income level  21344  5.035  2.575  1  10 
HH income missing  21344  0.190  0.393  0  1 
Low social class  21344  0.252  0.434  0  1 
Class missing  21344  0.195  0.396  0  1 
Highly religious  20705  0.132  0.338  0  1 
Note: OECD countries are Australia, Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA and West-Germany. 
Table A4: Summary statistics for CEE countries based on ISSP 1998 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Gender stereotype  10471  2.552  1.287  1  5 
Female  10672  0.534  0.499  0  1 
Age  10660  44.568  16.963  16  92 
Divorced/separated  10665  0.085  0.279  0  1 
Widow  10665  0.109  0.312  0  1 
Married  10665  0.604  0.489  0  1 
Household size  10672  3.120  1.531  1  15 
HH size missing  10672  0.004  0.059  0  1 
Secondary education  10655  0.611  0.488  0  1 
Tertiary education  10655  0.161  0.368  0  1 
Retired  10646  0.228  0.420  0  1 
Part-time employed  10646  0.053  0.224  0  1 
Not in labour force  10646  0.116  0.320  0  1 
Unemployed  10646  0.097  0.296  0  1 
Cohabitation  10672  0.058  0.233  0  1 
Child in household  10672  0.360  0.480  0  1 
Single parent  10672  0.021  0.143  0  1 
Child missing  10672  0.100  0.300  0  1 
Household income level  10672  5.252  2.579  1  10 
HH income missing  10672  0.165  0.371  0  1 
Low social class  10672  0.433  0.495  0  1 
Class missing  10672  0.070  0.255  0  1 
Highly religious  10305  0.133  0.339  0  1 
Note: CEE countries are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, East-Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Russia, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. - 57 - 
 
Table A5: correlation matrix 





















Women  1                         
Age  0.013  1                       
HH size  -0.016  -0.318  1                     
secondary  -0.018  -0.196  0.072  1                   
Tertiary  -0.025  -0.109  -0.020  -0.564  1                 
Retired  -0.023  0.642  -0.277  -0.142  -0.096  1               
Part-empl.  0.126  -0.093  0.049  0.012  0.049  -0.162  1             
Not labour  0.024  -0.202  0.024  0.005  0.023  -0.158  -0.115  1           
Unemploy  -0.015  -0.118  0.048  0.037  -0.048  -0.116  -0.084  -0.082  1         
Child HH  0.043  -0.305  0.518  0.076  -0.013  -0.275  0.065  -0.030  0.014  1       
HH 
income  -0.085  -0.176  0.235  0.025  0.214  -0.207  0.019  -0.066  -0.089  0.132  1     
Low class  -0.021  0.057  0.044  0.038  -0.229  0.056  -0.038  -0.039  0.080  0.026  -0.207  1   
religious  0.072  0.126  0.016  -0.072  -0.019  0.081  -0.021  0.010  -0.019  -0.002  -0.086  0.047  1 
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Table A6: Logistic regression results by region, dependent variable is set to 1 if respondent agreed or 
strongly agreed with patriarchal attitudes, 0 otherwise  
  OECD countries  CEE countries 
Female  -0.497  -0.452 
   (0.041)***  (0.045)*** 
Age  0.032  0.015 
   (0.002)***  (0.002)*** 
Divorced/separated  -0.158  0.134 
   (0.089)*  (0.100) 
Widow  0.112  0.133 
   (0.088)  (0.111) 
Married  0.066  0.076 
   (0.059)  (0.074) 
Household size  0.107  0.096 
   (0.017)***  (0.020)*** 
HH size missing  0.426  0.341 
   (0.091)***  (0.398) 
Secondary education  -0.668  -0.266 
   (0.042)***  (0.060)*** 
Tertiary education  -1.297  -0.726 
   (0.062)***  (0.079)*** 
Retired  0.141  0.023 
   (0.062)**  (0.077) 
Part-time employed  -0.167  0.015 
   (0.068)**  (0.097) 
Not in labour force  0.313  0.273 
   (0.052)***  (0.066)*** 
Unemployed  -0.039  0.003 
   (0.100)  (0.077) 
Cohabitation  -0.508  -0.023 
   (0.098)***  (0.095) 
Child in household  -0.018  0.233 
   (0.059)  (0.062)*** 
Single parent family  -0.199  -0.022 
   (0.144)  (0.158) 
Child data missing  -0.532  -1.030 
   (0.063)***  (0.082)*** 
HH income level  -0.080  -0.064 
   (0.009)***  (0.010)*** 
HH income missing  0.206  -0.263 
   (0.044)***  (0.060)*** 
Low social class  -0.067  0.595 
   (0.045)  (0.048)*** 
Class data missing  -0.541  -0.066 
   (0.049)***  (0.088) 
Highly religious  0.788  0.596 
   (0.048)***  (0.068)*** 
Constant  -1.761  -0.329 
  (0.108)***  (0.134)** 
Observations  20145  10087 
Pseudo R-squared  0.15  0.09 
log-lklhd  -9729.87  -6310.19 
Note: this table gives the parameter estimates on that decomposition results presented in Table 10 are based 
on. OECD countries are Austria, Australia, Denmark, Italy, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, the Netherlands, - 59 - 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, USA and West-Germany. CEE countries are Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, East-Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Slovakia and Slovenia. Source: ISSP 
1998, author’s calculations. Note: standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%.  - 60 - 
 
Table A7: Slopes of agreement by age group in respective countries (Model 1, Section 6) 
  ￿1 (slope)  s.e.  ￿0 Const  s.e. 
Slovenia  4.48  0.42  4.42  2.78 
Hungary  3.88  0.45  23.46  3.43 
Poland  3.79  0.43  38.75  2.98 
Slovakia  2.98  0.44  41.55  2.41 
Czech 
Republic  2.44  0.42  28.18  2.84 
Germany East  2.22  0.44  19.04  3.21 
Latvia  2.04  0.45  47.84  2.75 
Bulgaria  0.84  0.43  60.91  3.04 
Russia  0.84  0.36  65.89  2.23 
OECD  3.97  0.09  3.46  0.59 
Note: this table gives regression results of Model (1), Section 6. Results are ordered by the increase of 
traditional values with older age groups (slope) and can be interpreted as follows: in OECD countries 
agreement with patriarchal attitudes increases for about 4 percent with each older age group/birth cohort 
(that comprises 5 years).  
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Source: ISSP 1998 
Note: OECD refers to unweighted average. - 62 - 
Table A8: Agreement with gender stereotypes over time, remainder of regression results given in 
Table 11 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Female  0.468  0.458  0.467  0.458 
  (0.020)***  (0.020)***  (0.020)***  (0.020)*** 
Age  -0.023  -0.025  -0.023  -0.025 
  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
Divorced/separated  -0.140  -0.070  -0.139  -0.074 
  (0.044)***  (0.044)  (0.044)***  (0.044)* 
Widow  -0.357  -0.260  -0.355  -0.262 
  (0.048)***  (0.048)***  (0.048)***  (0.048)*** 
Married  -0.229  -0.183  -0.228  -0.186 
  (0.032)***  (0.032)***  (0.032)***  (0.032)*** 
HH size  -0.098  -0.090  -0.098  -0.090 
  (0.008)***  (0.008)***  (0.008)***  (0.008)*** 
HH size missing  -0.083  -0.174  -0.082  -0.175 
  (0.042)**  (0.042)***  (0.042)**  (0.042)*** 
Secondary edu.  0.399  0.406  0.399  0.407 
  (0.023)***  (0.023)***  (0.023)***  (0.024)*** 
Tertiary edu.  0.974  1.012  0.973  1.011 
  (0.030)***  (0.030)***  (0.030)***  (0.030)*** 
Retired  -0.184  -0.216  -0.185  -0.218 
  (0.032)***  (0.032)***  (0.032)***  (0.032)*** 
Part-time   0.005  -0.010  0.006  -0.010 
employed  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.034) 
Not in labour  -0.390  -0.347  -0.387  -0.347 
force  (0.028)***  (0.028)***  (0.028)***  (0.028)*** 
Unemployed  -0.031  -0.159  -0.028  -0.160 
  (0.042)  (0.042)***  (0.042)  (0.042)*** 
Cohabitation  0.337  0.294  0.335  0.301 
  (0.032)***  (0.032)***  (0.032)***  (0.033)*** 
Child in HH  -0.012  -0.021  -0.012  -0.019 
  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031) 
Single parent  0.239  0.184  0.239  0.185 
  (0.078)***  (0.078)**  (0.078)***  (0.078)** 
Child missing  0.388  0.393  0.386  0.393 
  (0.028)***  (0.028)***  (0.028)***  (0.028)*** 
HH income level  0.073  0.065  0.073  0.065 
  (0.004)***  (0.004)***  (0.004)***  (0.004)*** 
HH income miss  -0.017  -0.002  -0.019  -0.001 
  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024) 
Low social class  -0.063  -0.074  -0.063  -0.075 
  (0.022)***  (0.022)***  (0.022)***  (0.022)*** 
Class missing  0.207  0.137  0.203  0.143 
  (0.026)***  (0.026)***  (0.026)***  (0.026)*** 
Highly religious  -0.141  -0.110  -0.143  -0.109 
  (0.024)***  (0.024)***  (0.024)***  (0.024)*** 
Source: ISSP 1998 and 1994. Note: standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1% 
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